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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE
PORTS AUTHORITY: SMALL ICEBERG OR JUST THE TIP?

PROFESSOR GORDON G. YOUNG*
Where does the Constitution contain the principle of law that the Court
enunciates? I cannot find the answer to this question in any text, in any
tradition, or in any relevant purpose. In saying this, I do not simply reiterate
the dissenting views set forth in many of the Court’s recent sovereign immunity
decisions. For even were I to believe that those decisions properly stated the
law—which I do not—I still could not accept the Court’s conclusion here.1
Reaction to the [Maritime] decision across the ideological spectrum was less
than enthusiastic, to put it mildly. Said one conservative scholar, “I’m
beginning to be embarrassed.”
...
[However,] Conservative Bruce Fein said the decision is largely symbolic. Mr.
Bruce Fein . . .: “It seems to be, you know, a lot of bombast about very little.”2

INTRODUCTION
Along with the text of the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s federalism
and separation of powers cases define the overall structure of government in
the United States. These cases run together in Federal Maritime Commission
v. South Carolina State Ports Authority (hereinafter “Maritime”), 3 decided by
the Supreme Court near the end of last term. Intersecting in Maritime are cases
dealing with state immunity from private suits under federal law4 and those
* Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. I appreciate the comments of Jeremiah
Collins and Bob Percival, who were co-panelists with me at a Faculty Workshop on the Maritime
case held at the School of Law, and the comments of my colleagues who participated in the
ensuing discussion. Special thanks are due Ruth Fleischer and Richard Boldt for help and
encouragement and the Dean of the School of Law for a summer grant that funded, among other
research, work on this article.
1. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1881 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
2. All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, May 28, 2002) (Nina
Totenberg reporting and quoting a number of legal scholars) [hereinafter NPR].
3. 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002).
4. See infra notes 24-70 and accompanying text.
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dealing with transfers of federal judicial power from the regular Article III
courts to the executive branch agencies, or the so-called legislative courts.5 In
ways bearing on the issues in Maritime, the cases dealing with adjudication
outside of Article III courts are also connected with the hazy line that is drawn
in constitutional case law between the public and private spheres.
Justice Thomas’ opinion for the majority of justices in Maritime, including
Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, held “that state sovereign
immunity bars [federal administrative agencies] from adjudicating complaints
filed by . . . private part[ies] against . . . nonconsenting State[s].”6 In so
holding, those five justices, a perennial states’ rights bare majority, continue a
line of cases that they inaugurated in 1995, which greatly strengthened the
states’ immunity from suits under federal law.7 Viewed more broadly, they
5. See infra notes 71-119 and accompanying text.
6. Maritime, 122 S. Ct. at 1874. The unedited quotation initially focuses on the
Constitutionality of the precise adjudication in Maritime, but then turns to consider not just this
instance but “such an adjudication.” Unedited and in full, it reads:
This case presents the question whether state sovereign immunity precludes petitioner
Federal Maritime Commission (FMC or Commission) from adjudicating a private party’s
complaint that a state-run port has violated the Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. App. §
1701 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V). We hold that state sovereign immunity bars such an
adjudicative proceeding.
Id. at 1867-68. Other portions of the opinion (1) make it clear that state immunity applies at least
to all private party initiated and controlled agency litigation (a) seeking damages from states
regardless of whether the state or an officer is named a party and (b) seeking any remedy if the
state is named a party, and (2) arguably suggest that, unlike suits in courts, those in agencies are
barred by immunity even if brought against state officers simply to compel future compliance
with federal law. Id. at 1874-79. Beyond this, I sense the possibility that Maritime may be a step
toward a reappraisal of such officer suits when brought in court and much more remotely to a
reappraisal of the largely dormant anti-delegation doctrine as applied to agencies’ powers to
regulate states. The latter two concerns may be my imagination fueled (1) by the recent
progression of state immunity cases, (2) by what I see as significant silences in the Maritime
majority opinion, and (3) by my sense that, if reappraisal of the relationship of the new
administrative state to federalism begins with state immunity, states rights partisans will be drawn
to a reconsideration of related separation of powers issues as well. By this I mean that, for
reasons of state dignity so prominently stressed in Maritime, the Court conceivably could tighten
the requirements of the anti-delegation doctrine as applied to regulation of states. This would
force Congress itself, rather than agencies, to do more of the policy making in such cases. Such a
development would make regulation of states more difficult and would be an oblique method of
limiting Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 555-57 (1985). Garcia permits,
over the objections of several of the current states’ rights justices, Congress to regulate the states
under the Commerce Clause and other original powers.
7. The first and most important of these cases is Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 54, 59-73, 73-77 (1996), which overruled an earlier case that allowed Congress to
abrogate state immunity when imposing duties on states in legislation supported only by the
Interstate Commerce Cause and clarified the Court’s view that state immunity is based on an
implicit original constitutional understanding. In addition, the Court found the normal injunctive
remedy against state officers who act unconstitutionally preempted by a special remedy created
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extended a larger group of cases strengthening states’ rights in general, which
those Justices originated in 1992 and of which the immunity cases are one
subset.8 All of these federalism cases have been strongly polarized and have
included powerful dissents, most often by Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer and
Ginsburg, making the margin in most cases 5-4.9
On two occasions, dissenters have taken the unusual step of reading their
opinions from the bench.10 Maritime is the second of these, demonstrating the
strength of the reaction that the majority opinion provoked. Justice Breyer’s
dissent contains the following passage:
Where does the Constitution contain the principle of law that the Court
enunciates? I cannot find the answer to this question in any text, in any
tradition, or in any relevant purpose. In saying this, I do not simply reiterate
the dissenting views set forth in many of the Court’s recent sovereign immunity

by Congress under the Indian Gaming Act, despite the Court having ruled that remedy
unconstitutional and thus leaving the plaintiffs without direct recourse in enforcing their rights.
See Gordon G. Young, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 56 MD. L. REV. 1411, 1428-33 (1997)
(examining the possible implications of the Seminole Tribe holding on the development of state
immunity jurisprudence) (cited in LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 554
(3d ed. 2000), for the proposition that a more limited argument under the Tenth Amendment
might well have been preferable to opening the door to close scrutiny of statutes for the
preemption of the usual injunctive remedy). The second of these cases is Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 754 (1999), which held that state immunity permits states to refuse to provide state
judicial fora to hear suits against states under federal law despite a general requirement that state
courts entertain suits arising under federal law in cases not involving the state as a defendant.
8. The first case is New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992), which held that
even legislation otherwise valid under the Commerce Clause violates the principles of federalism
if it forces states to enact, as state law, legislation dictated by Congress. The second case is
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995), which held for the first time in nearly sixty
years that a piece of legislation (the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990) is beyond Congress’
powers under the Commerce Clause. The third is Seminole Tribe. See supra note 7. The fourth
case is Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997), which held that Congress may not
compel state law executive officers to enforce the federal law to perform background checks on
perspective gun purchasers pursuant to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act). The fifth
is Alden, 527 U.S. at 754. The sixth case is United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18
(2000), which held that the Violence Against Women Act is beyond Congress’ Commerce Clause
powers despite voluminous findings that the violence it regulated substantially affected interstate
commerce. The seventh is Maritime.
9. Specifically, the vote splits were: New York v. United States 6-3, Lopez 5-4, Seminole
Tribe 5-4, Printz 5-4, Alden 5-4, Morrison 5-4, and Maritime 5-4.
10. See Michael Kirkland, Court Divides Again on Federalism, UNITED PRESS INT’L, May
28, 2002; David G. Savage, High Court Curbs Federal Lawsuits Against the States, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1996, at A1 (“In a rare occurrence, Justice David H. Souter read parts of his dissent [in
Seminole Tribe] from the bench. In written form, it ran to 92 pages.”).
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decisions. For even were I to believe that those decisions properly stated the
law—which I do not—I still could not accept the Court’s conclusion here.11

Despite these dissenting opinions, I conclude that the holding and clear
language of the majority opinion in Maritime breaks little, if any, new
ground.12 When Maritime is read fairly in the context of the earlier cases
dealing with state immunity, it is not, in fact, a large departure from the preexisting state immunity cases. Instead, it is a natural mapping of those
troubling decisions onto the landscape of the post-New Deal administrative
state. In Maritime, the immunity cases are projected onto that part of modern
constitutional law that permits, while it also limits, agency adjudication of
matters that were originally within the judicial power granted to the federal
courts by the text of the Constitution.13
Despite their protestations that Maritime is a serious extension of state
immunity, a very large part of what disturbs the dissenters must be the preexisting line of cases. They rightly deplore earlier cases to the extent that they
protect states from suits that assert rights created under federal law.14 But I
take them at their word, that Maritime is greatly disturbing to them and that
their objections range well beyond their dislike for that which went before it.
What then is the reason for their concern? I believe that what disturbs the
dissenters (and certainly what disturbs me) about Maritime is more subtle than
its holding or any of its clear statements. The truly unsettling things are
suggestions, which may be real or may be apparitions, appearing to readers
who are already unsettled by concerns about where recent limitations of federal
power will stop. In particular, the Maritime majority opinion, to me, provokes
two substantial worries.
The first of my concerns is the fate of agency adjudications, and even court
suits, against state officers (not against the state itself as in Maritime) to stop
prospective violations of federal law. Such suits are part of a precarious
balance worked out by the Court nearly a century ago in order to allow state
immunity to meaningfully coexist with the supremacy of federal law, which
the Constitution clearly dictates.15 Neither the holding in Maritime (where the
state, not an officer, was sued) nor any of its clear language contains such a
threat, and yet a threat appears to me. My speculation is that it appears to the
11. Maritime, 122 S. Ct. at 1881 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
12. See infra note 151-152 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 71-119 and accompanying text.
14. See generally the dissenting opinions in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Flordia, 517 U.S.
44, 76-84 (1996), and Alden, 527 U.S. 706, 760-814 (1999). See Young, supra note 7, at 1429
n.120 (I agree with the many commentators who believe that state immunity should be
inapplicable to suits under federal law).
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land”).
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dissenters in the same way. That perception is fueled by the opinion of two
Justices in a recent case urging new rigorous limitations on suits against state
officers,16 and also by a slightly earlier opinion embracing other new limits.17
My second concern is a broader one. Let us suppose that things turn out
well so that, over the next several years, the law that permits private suits in
courts against state officials does not change. Also suppose that the states’
rights majority chooses to apply different, more restrictive rules to federal
administrative agencies. If these things come to pass, then what does this
mean more broadly? If certain adjudicatory functions of the courts can freely
be transferred to agencies, but only when the state is not their target, are there
also special rules for the delegation of legislative power to regulate the states?
Will the new federalism agenda turn to (or branch out to include) special
separation of powers limitations on the federal government in cases where the
exertion of federal power affects the states? In theory, this would not bar
federal regulation of states under original federal grants of powers such as the
Commerce Clause, and, again in theory, it might make federal regulation of
states more accountable to the national political process.18 In practice, it could
make much federal regulation of states much more difficult.19
Maritime cannot be appraised solely from the perspective of the recent
state immunity cases or even from that of the broader set of states’ rights cases.
While the states’ rights line of decisions is dominant in Maritime (and states’
rights fervor the most powerful force shaping the decision), the correct result in

16. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 287-88 (1997) (holding that certain
suits against state officers to quiet title to land implicate major state interests are outside of the
exception to state immunity recognized for suits seeking prospective relief against state officers
and, thus, barred). This limited the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908),
which liberally permited injunctions against state officers to stop future violations of federal law.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion (otherwise for the majority), which was joined only by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, took the position that the availability of an injunction against a state officer, under the
Ex parte Young doctrine should depend upon a balancing test including, as one factor, the
availability of relief in state courts. Coeur d’ Alene, 521 U.S. at 270-88. For the disagreement of
Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas on this point, see Coeur d’ Alene, 521 U.S. at 291-97
(concluding that the suit in Coeur d’Alene was barred by a narrow exception to Ex parte Young
suits, which those justices saw as presumptively within the federal courts’ jurisdiction, and not
generally barred by principles of federalism, including immunity).
17. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74 (finding the normal injunctive remedy against state
officers who act unconstitutionally preempted by a special remedy created by Congress under the
Indian Gaming Act, despite the Court having ruled that remedy unconstitutional, and, thus,
leaving the plaintiffs without direct recourse in enforcing their rights). See also Young supra
note 7, at 1428-33 (examining the possible implications of the Seminole Tribe holding on the
development of state immunity jurisprudence).
18. See infra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing Garcia v. San Antonio Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
19. See infra notes 218-24 and accompanying text.
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the case is dependent on cases dealing with the separation of powers between
the executive and judicial branches.20
This group of cases concerns when and to what extent federal adjudication
can be conducted in agencies and in courts established outside of the
Constitution’s judiciary provisions. These cases are much less linear than the
virtual straight-line progression of the post-1992 cases protecting states from
various legislative and judicial actions taken to serve federal interests and to
enforce federal law.21 Among cases dealing with federal adjudication are
those, such as Crowell v. Benson22 that turn on the often razor thin distinction
between the public and private spheres.23 Ultimately, the force of Justice
Breyer’s dissent in Maritime depends on how much support such cases offer
for distinguishing—in ways relevant to the Constitutional policies underlying
20. Article III and its restrictions originally controlled federal adjudication. The restrictions
included requirements that federal judges be politically insulated and, according to a current
majority of justices, state immunity. That majority finds such immunity to have been an original,
implicit limit on the judicial power. When the Court began allowing federal adjudication outside
of Article III courts and particularly in agencies, the requirements for politically insulated judges
were eliminated or relaxed. The question that emerged was would the state immunity restrictions
against suing states follow federal adjudication into these new bodies? To answer this question,
one needs to understand both the state immunity line of cases and the line permitting some nonArticle III adjudication.
21. Article III vests the judicial power in “one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Those
courts are to be staffed by judges who are somewhat insulated from political pressures by a grant
of life tenure, subject to impeachment for “high crimes and misdemeanors” and by a prohibition
against having their salaries reduced. Id. The judicial power includes, among others, suits arising
under federal law, those to which either the United States or a state or both are parties, suits
between citizens of different states, and admiralty cases. Id. § 2, cl. 1. The cases discussed below
all consider when adjudication outside of Article III courts is consistent with Article III, given
that the latter might be read to cover all federal adjudications of the sort described as within the
judicial power. All but Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50 (1982), permit such non-Article III adjudication in the circumstances presented to it, and all
offer at least clues to the factors bearing on the validity of such adjudication. See Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933); N. Pipeline, 458
U.S. 50; Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); Commodities Futures
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). See also Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and
the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray’s Lessee through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV.
765 (1986).
22. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
23. This is an amorphous set of cases dealing with the public and private distinction in a
variety of contexts. Each is different, but there are commonalities and mutual influences between
them. The cases included in note 21 sort out the distinction between public rights cases with
respect to which the Court more freely has permitted federal adjudication outside of Article III
courts and private rights cases, where it has demanded more safeguards, but still allowed agency
and Article I court litigation. See supra note 21. Other cases which may well have influenced the
Article III public and private cases include substantive due process cases. See Young, supra note
21, at 807-38.
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state immunity—agency adjudication from private dispute resolution in the
courts.
BACKGROUND
State Immunity
In the last decade, a majority of the Court (usually the same five justices)24
has engaged in constitutional interpretation that intensifies states’ protection
from the effects of federal legislation aimed at regulating them. Some of these
protections take the form of new limits on federal power that regulate certain
state activities. Some cases limit Congress’ ability to regulate any activity,
including those of the states, under the Commerce Clause.25 Others are
designed to protect the states alone. These include cases that limit Congress’
power to regulate pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.26 Also included are
cases invoking the Tenth Amendment and other limitations providing special
state protection from legislation that is otherwise within the scope of federal
legislative powers.27
Some of the cases protecting the states do not put their activity beyond
regulation by the federal government, but rather limit the remedies that can be
used to enforce valid regulations.28 The state immunity cases are the focus
24. The Justices are Scalia, Thomas, Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Kennedy.
25. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000) (holding the Violence Against
Women Act went beyond Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1990 went beyond Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause). In these cases, the
Supreme Court, for the first time in nearly sixty years, found that a federal statute regulating
private activity exceeded Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause. See also Lynn A.
Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1911-12 (1995).
26. In Section One, the Fourteenth Amendment creates private rights in individuals against
states that deprive them of due process, the equal protection of the laws, or the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section Five
provides: “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.” Id. § 5. See cases cited infra note 56.
27. In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180 (1992), the five current states’ rights
justices, this time joined by Justice Souter, invalidated federal regulation of the states that
required states either to enact laws possessing a content specified by Congress or to assume large
monetary liabilities. That decision was based on concern for the states’ rights. See id. The
Court’s renewed interest in the early 1990’s becomes clear from a comparison of New York v.
United States with an earlier case, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469
U.S. 528, 556-57 (1985), which concluded that, with rare exceptions, the Court should not
invalidate federal legislation, otherwise within Congressional power, simply because states are
the objects of regulation and finding states’ representation in the national political process is
usually a sufficient protection of their interests.
28. Before considering the availability of remedies for state violation of duties imposed on
them on behalf of private parties, it is important to understand the law concerning the
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here. They limit the remedies available to enforce even those federal
regulations of states that remain valid after the recent limitations. First, it is
important to an understanding of Maritime to stress that actions against a state
by the United States have never been covered by state immunity.29 To the
extent that the proceedings in Maritime were appropriately characterized as
suits by the United States, as some of the parties claimed, they would not be
precluded by immunity if brought in a court. If this is true, that may have a
strong bearing on whether they should be barred when brought in a federal
agency.30
Second, to the extent that the proceedings in Maritime were analogized to
suits by private parties against states, the naming of the state as a party in the
position of a defendant would be fatal to an action brought in federal court.31
Under the current Supreme Court decisions, a suit against a “statewide
agency,” such as the agency defendant in Maritime, is viewed as a suit against
the state.32 Furthermore, even if an officer, and not the state, were the named

constitutionality of such duties themselves. The Court has vacillated as to whether and to what
extent special rules, applicable only to regulation as it affects the states, apply as a result of the
Tenth Amendment or implicit rules of Constitutional federalism. See infra note 220 and
accompanying text. The last Supreme Court case dealing generally with this issue, Garcia, held
that Congress can regulate the states under the Commerce Clause in the same way that it regulates
individuals because the states’ indirect representation in the federal political process provides
them with adequate assurance of a meaningful existence. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555-57. Three
Justices dissented, threatening to overturn Garcia. Id. at 557-89 (Powell, Rehnquist, O’Connor,
JJ., dissenting). Since that case, the Supreme Court has prohibited certain very specialized forms
of federal regulations of the states. However, Garcia remains the last pronouncement on most
forms of such regulation and, as long as it lasts, it is permissive.
The state immunity cases assume that the states can be subjected to substantive duties on
behalf of individuals, but bar an assertion of those rights directly against the states as defendants
without their consent, and it bars them when brought against state officers if the relief sought is
damages from the state treasury. The immunity cases, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996) and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), are discussed supra note 7 and in the
several paragraphs of text following this footnote.
29. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329 (1934) (holding that
immunity bars suits against states by foreign states, while stating, in dictum, that no immunity
exists for suits brought by the United States) (citing United States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S.
211, 216 (1890) (adjudicating on the merits a claim by the United States against the state on a
debt)); see also Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 84 (1907) (finding a suit by one state against
another within the federal judicial power and not barred by state immunity, but dismissing on
other grounds).
30. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965).
31. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
32. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 781-82 (1978) (requiring dismissal, on grounds of
state immunity, of proceedings brought against Alabama and its Board of Corrections by current
and former inmates seeking a mandatory injunction to improve prison conditions). See also
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1056 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (citing Edelman, 415 U.S. 459
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defendant, that portion of Maritime in which a private party sought monetary
compensation for a past wrong from the state treasury would also be barred if
brought in court.33 Because portions of Maritime are arguably private actions
that would have been barred if brought in court, a rudimentary understanding
of the states’ immunity to suits by private parties is essential to analyzing
Maritime. The rules applying to courts, however, would not be dispositive if
agencies, when acting judicially, and courts are properly treated as sufficiently
different for purposes of immunity.34 Ultimately, the question becomes—
given the mutual resemblance of federal courts and agencies and their greatly
overlapping functions—do agencies differ sufficiently from courts to warrant
an exception to the usual immunity rules for agency adjudication?
The state immunity cases are often described as “Eleventh Amendment
cases” referring to a 1798 Constitutional Amendment that prohibits federal
suits brought against unconsenting states by certain individuals—“[c]itizens of
another state.”35 The Amendment’s language does not bar suits against a state
by its own citizens. But state immunity, in the current majority’s view,
originates in something more primal than the text of the Eleventh Amendment
and ranges well beyond the suits prohibited by that provision’s language.36
(1974) (reversing that portion of a lower court decision permitting, in a lawsuit against state
officers, an award of retroactive monetary compensation to be paid from a state’s treasury)). See
infra note 204 and accompanying text.
33. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (“It is one thing to . . . [require a state officer to
comply with federal law in the future.] It is quite another to order . . . [him] to use state funds to
make reparation for the past. The latter would appear to us to fall afoul of the Eleventh
Amendment . . . .”) (citations omitted).
34. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
35. The Eleventh Amendment reads as follows:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
36. First, the Seminole Tribe Court viewed the Eleventh Amendment as merely a correction
of Chisholm’s mistaken view that the Constitution permits federal courts to hear suits against
states brought by citizens of other states. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69
(1996) (“[W]e long have recognized that blind reliance upon the text of the Eleventh Amendment
is ‘to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of.’ The
text dealt in terms only with the problem presented by the decision in Chisholm . . . .” (quoting
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 326 (1934) (quoting Hans v. Louisana, 134
U.S. 1, 15 (1890)) (citations omitted)). Second, because no similar mistake had destroyed the
original, implicit immunity protecting a state against any federal suit brought by its own citizens,
that immunity continued to exist without need of support from a constitutional amendment.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69. Thus, the Seminole Tribe majority believed that the
Constitution’s original, implicit state immunity prohibited citizens of any state from bringing any
federal court suit against a state. Id. at 67. The Court stated:
“[n]either the literal sweep of the words of Clause one of § 2 of Article III [permitting
Congress to give federal courts jurisdiction over suits arising under federal law], nor the
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Today, state immunity prohibits federal suits against unconsenting states
brought by their own citizens and covers suits in state as well as federal
court.37
Powerful arguments have been made that the Eleventh Amendment’s
prohibition on suits against a state by citizens of another state was not meant to
apply to suits brought to enforce federal law.38 This position has not been that
of a majority of the Supreme Court. In Hans v. Louisiana,39 the Court
rendered a doubly significant decision holding that a suit brought under federal
law against Louisiana by its own citizens was barred.40 Thus, the Court not
only rejected an exemption for suits based on federal law but extended
immunity beyond the Amendment’s literal scope.41 Hans is a confusing

absence of restriction in the letter of the Eleventh Amendment, permits the conclusion that
in all controversies of the sort described in Clause one, and omitted from the words of the
Eleventh Amendment, a State may be sued without her consent.”
Id. (quoting Monaco, 292 U.S. at 321).
37. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758-59 (1999).
38. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 290, reh’g denied, 473 U.S. 926
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) Justice Brennan stated, as follows:
Article III grants a federal-question jurisdiction to the federal courts that is as broad as is
the lawmaking authority of Congress. If Congress acting within its Article I or other
powers creates a legal right and remedy, and if neither the right nor the remedy violates
any provision of the Constitution outside Article III, then Congress may entrust
adjudication of claims based on the newly created right to the federal courts — even if the
defendant is a State. Neither Article III nor the Eleventh Amendment imposes an
independent limit on the lawmaking authority of Congress. This view makes sense of the
language, history, and purposes of Article III and of the Eleventh Amendment. It is also
the view that was adopted in the earliest interpretations of the Amendment by the
Marshall Court.
Atascadero State Hospital, 473 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Substantial scholarship
cited in Justice Brennan’s opinion supporting the view that the Eleventh Amendment was not
meant to prohibit suits asserting federal causes of action. Id. at 259 n.11. See William A.
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an
Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 1033, 1130 (1983) (“[T]he amendment left both admiralty and federal question jurisdiction
to operate according to their own terms, authorizing federal courts to entertain private citizens’
suits against the states whenever based on valid substantive federal law.”); John J. Gibbons, The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1889, 2004 (1983) (“It is time for the Supreme Court to acknowledge that the Eleventh
Amendment applies only to cases in which the jurisdiction of the federal court depends solely
upon party status.”).
39. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
40. Id. at 20-21 (holding that each state possesses immunity from a suit brought against it by
one of its citizens in federal court based on federal law).
41. The amendment only prohibits suits against a state by “Citizens of another state.” U.S.
CONST. amend XI (emphasis added). Hans was a suit against Louisiana by one of its own
citizens. Hans, 134 U.S. at 20-21.
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opinion42 and the first clear explanation of the existence of state immunity
beyond the Amendment’s provisions, which came in 1995 as part of the new
set of states’ rights opinions.43
Seminole Tribe v. Florida44 makes clear the current states’ rights
majority’s view that an implicit part of the original constitutional
understanding was that states possessed immunity from suits brought by
private parties in federal court to enforce either state or federal law.45 In other
words, state immunity, among other things,46 is an unstated limitation on
Article III. Specifically, it is a limitation on what would otherwise be within
federal courts’ jurisdiction under the federal judicial power. Under these
limitations, despite any apparently contrary language in Article III appearing to
grant jurisdiction over such suits, individuals could not sue either states or
statewide agencies in federal court and certain suits against state officers
seeking damages were barred even if a state was not named.47 This immunity
42. While a careful reading of most Supreme Court opinions on the subject makes clear that
Hans immunity is not based on the Eleventh Amendment, a casual reader could easily be
confused by isolated passages. For example, the Court stated: “[T]hus, in Hans v. Louisiana, the
Court held that the Amendment barred a citizen from bringing a suit against his own State in
federal court, even though the express terms of the [Eleventh] Amendment do not so provide.”
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238. “Whether Illinois permits such a suit to be brought against the State
in its own courts is not determinative of whether Illinois has relinquished its Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in the federal courts.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 n.
19 (1974) (citations omitted). That Edelman more properly involved Hans immunity and not
Eleventh Amendment immunity is evident from the fact that Edelman was not a suit against a
state by citizens of different states, as the Amendment specifies, but was a suit against Illinois by
its own citizen-welfare recipients. This seems implicit in the Supreme Court opinion in Edelman,
but is even clearer in the opinion of the court below. See Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 990
(7th Cir. 1973).
Passages in Hans itself can easily be mistaken as statements that a state’s immunity from
suits by its own citizens comes from the Amendment although a more careful reading would
convince otherwise. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 10-12.
43. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (5-4 decision)
(overruling an earlier case that allowed Congress to abrogate state immunity when imposing
duties on states in legislation supported only by the Indian Commerce Clause, clarifying the
Court’s view that state immunity is based on an implicit original constitutional understanding,
and finding the normal injunctive remedy against state officers who act unconstitutionally
preempted by a special remedy created by Congress under the Indian Gaming Act, despite the
Court’s having ruled that remedy unconstitutional and thus leaving the plaintiffs without direct
recourse in enforcing their rights).
44. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
45. Id. at 72.
46. It is also a limitation on what would otherwise be a state’s obligation to enforce federal
law in its own courts under the Supremacy Clause. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732
(1999).
47. Suits against states and state agencies as named parties are barred by state immunity,
regardless of the relief sought. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 781-82, cert. denied, 438
U.S. 915 (1978). Suits seeking damages from the state treasury are also barred, even if an officer,
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was constitutionally hard, meaning that it would not yield to congressional
attempts to abrogate it, except where such attempts were part of legislation
properly enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.48 The latter was, and possibly
the other Reconstruction Amendments were, viewed as overriding the original
state immunity to the extent necessary to enforce legislation implementing its
requirements that states accord due process and equal protection and honor the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.49
In 1992, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,50 the Supreme Court expanded
Congress’s powers of abrogation, so that immunity could be overridden, not
just when Congress legislated under the Reconstruction Amendments, but
when it acted under the Commerce Clause and presumably other federal
legislative powers as well.51 After Union Gas, Congress, by clear statement,
could make states accountable in federal court to private individuals for
violation of any duty that Congress had the substantive authority to impose on
them.52 This was true whether the duty was enforceable by injunction or by an
action for monetary compensation, whether the state or just an officer was
named defendant, and whether the duty ran to the federal government or to
private parties as beneficiaries.
In Seminole Tribe, the states’ rights majority inaugurated a new wave of
immunity cases by, among other things, overruling Union Gas.53 Thus, the
Seminole Tribe majority opinion once again limited congressional overrides of
state immunity to those circumstances where necessary to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments.54 Seminole Tribe also suggested the possibility
that the Court would recognize new and confining restrictions on suits against
not the state itself or a statewide agency, is sued. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 32, at 1056
(citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (reversing that portion of a lower court decision
permitting, in a lawsuit against state officers, an award of retroactive monetary compensation to
be paid from a state’s treasury)).
48. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (“For over a century we
have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States ‘was not
contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.’”)
(quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 15).
49. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976), rev’d without opinion 573 F.2d 1292
(2d Cir. 1977) (concluding that “Congress may, when enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally
impermissible in other contexts.”) (footnote omitted).
50. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996).
51. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 5 (5-4 decision) (holding that, when legislating pursuant to
the Commerce Clause, Congress has power to create a cause of action in favor of a private party
against a state for monetary damages).
52. The Seminole Court overruled Union Gas Co., which permitted abrogation under the
Interstate Commerce Clause. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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state officers to prospectively enforce federal law, suits the Court had long
exempted from state immunity.55 Within a few years after Seminole Tribe, the
states’ rights majority moved to limit, but not eliminate, congressional
overrides under the Fourteenth Amendment. The method used was the
imposition of highly restrictive limits on Congress’ power to act at all under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.56 Valid enforcement measures might
be prophylactic to some extent, but they must be tightly tailored to stop
repeated violations of the Amendment as interpreted by the Court.57
Another group of cases dealing with state immunity is crucial to any
understanding of Maritime, particularly the portion dealing with the injunctivestyle relief also barred by Justice Thomas’ opinion. These cases limit state
immunity by excluding certain injunctive actions from the definition of suits
against states.58 Before 1976, when the Court first allowed abrogation of state
immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment, there existed an especially
delicate problem of squaring state immunity from suit with the fact that states
are subject to duties imposed on them by federal statutes and constitutional

55. Id. at 73 n.16 (discussing statutory preemption of the usual injunctive remedy). See also
Young supra note 7, at 1436 (criticizing this limitation of the usual remedy).
56. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
630, aff’d by 527 U.S. 666 (1999), the Court confronted a patent infringement claim against the
State of Florida. The majority rejected Congress’s attempt to expose states to such suits but
recognized that patent rights were property rights whose violation might allow congressional
authorization of a suit against an offending state in an appropriate circumstance. Id. at 637-46.
Among other things it was (1) the lack of evidence of systematic and intentional violation of
federally created property rights, and (2) the lack of evidence that state law remedies were
inadequate that caused the Court to find no deprivation of property cognizable under the
Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, no power of Congress, under Section 5 of that Amendment, to
abrogate immunity as an appropriate way of enforcing the Amendment itself. Id. Finally, in
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000), a majority of the Court found that the
provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 purporting to abrogate state
immunity were beyond Congress’ powers of remediation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Bd. of Trs. Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2000); City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
57. All of the opinions concluding that Congress exceeded its powers under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment recognized that “enforcement” may include creation of prophylactic rules
going beyond the constitutional rights themselves in order to insure satisfactory enforcement of
the latter. However, all of them assumed that definition of the central constitutional rights
themselves was a job solely for the Court alone and that it was only those Court-defined rights
that Congress might enforce, even if somewhat prophylactically.
58. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908) (“[I]ndividuals who, as officers of the
State . . . threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to
enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be
enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action.”); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at
52-57 (recognizing the validity of federal court suits brought by private parties to force state
officers’ prospective compliance with federal law, although recognizing that specific federal laws
may implicitly preclude such suits by providing alternative remedies).
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provisions. This is particularly clear in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which is directed at creating private rights only against states and in favor of
individuals who claim state violations of due process, equal protection and the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.59 Without some sort
of compromise, these would have been nearly rights without remedies.60 There
would have been few remedies for violation of these rights before the Supreme
Court recognized Congressional power to abrogate state immunity in 1976.61
Outside of the civil rights context, a compromise was acutely needed to
enforce duties imposed on states for the benefit of individuals by Congress
under the Commerce Clause. Such duties generally are permitted by current
case law, but suits for compensation from the treasury or any relief against the
state as a named party have been impossible, except for the roughly halfdecade interlude under Union Gas.62
The compromise solution was worked out at least by the end of the first
decade of the twentieth century. Ex parte Young63 holds that suits against state
officers to enjoin them from violating federal law are considered suits against
the officers and not the state itself and, thus, are not barred by state
59. In relevant part, the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
60. The Fourteenth Amendment could have been used as a defense to criminal and civil suits
brought by states against private parties. For example, assertion of the First Amendment or
procedural due process in a criminal or civil proceeding brought by the state would not itself be a
barred suit. However, preemptive suits to stop such action or to stop states from harming
individuals without the use of the courts, would have gone without a federal judicial remedy.
After Alden, without a federal requirement, state courts supply such a judicial remedy. See Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751-56 (1999).
61. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 448 (1976). Before Fitzpatrick, Fourteenth
Amendment rights could have been enforced as defenses to criminal proceedings and civil suits
brought by states and in suits under the Ex parte Young doctrine seeking to enjoin officers from
prospective violations of federal law. See id. at 458-59. Until Alden, it remained an open
question whether state courts could, despite the Supremacy Clause, decline federal rights suits
against their own sovereigns on immunity grounds. In 1999, Alden made clear that such
immunity exists in state courts. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713. These possibilities aside, federal court
suits against states as named defendants and those against state officers seeking, in effect,
damages from state treasuries from past wrongs, were barred.
62. Because abrogation of immunity can be accomplished by Congress only when it acts
under a Reconstruction Amendment, most economic regulation of states has been forbidden
enforcement by damage suits or by any remedy against the state as a named party. Abrogation
under the Commerce Clause and other original powers was possible during the roughly halfdecade between the decision of Union Gas and that of Seminole Tribe. See supra notes 48–53
and accompanying text.
63. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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immunity.64 This is true even though the officers are faithfully enforcing state
policy made by the state legislature or constitutional convention.65 When these
suits interfere with enforcement of official policy made by state legislatures
and agencies, and not just with rogue action by state officers, they are, in
reality, suits against states. Policy moves from the books to the world only by
the intermediation of officers. The Supreme Court has acknowledged as much,
admitting that Ex parte Young is a fiction, designed to permit the most urgent
of suits aimed at state action in violation of federal law.66
The Court, however, has drawn the line at federal court suits against state
officers seeking to restrain future violations of the law. Injunctions against
states as named parties are prohibited, as are suits against officers in their
official capacities to recover state funds as compensation for past wrongs, even
though care is taken not to name the state itself as a party.67 To recapitulate:
(1) one cannot sue in federal court to recover damages against state funds to
compensate for past wrongs, no matter who is named defendant or the

64. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
65. Ex parte Young involved a suit to enjoin state officers from enforcing an otherwise duly
enacted state law on the grounds that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. at 142-43.
66. In subsequent case law reviewing the opinion, the Court stated:
[T]he injunction in Young was justified, notwithstanding the obvious impact on the
State itself, on the view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who
acts unconstitutionally is “stripped of his official or representative character.” This
rationale, of course, created the “well-recognized irony” that an official’s unconstitutional
conduct constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit
the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to “the
supreme authority of the United States.” As Justice Brennan has observed, “Ex parte
Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the
Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured
elsewhere in the Constitution.” Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the Young
doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights.
The Court also has recognized, however, that the need to promote the supremacy of
federal law must be accommodated to the constitutional immunity of the States. This is
the significance of Edelman v. Jordan. We recognized that the prospective relief
authorized by Young “has permitted the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to
serve as a sword, rather than merely a shield, for those whom they were designed to
protect.” But we declined to extend the fiction of Young to encompass retroactive relief,
for to do so would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the States.
Penhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104-05 (1984) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted); see also PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS:
SECTION 1983 AND RELATED STATUTES 871 (2d ed. 1994) (characterizing Ex parte Young as
resting “on a fictional tour de force.”).
67. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 666-71 (1974) (citing Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47
(1944)).
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technical nature of the remedy, (2) federal court injunctions seeking to restrain
state officers from future violation of federal law are permitted, but (3)
injunctive or even damage suits against states as named parties are allowed if a
state consents to them or Congress appropriately abrogates state immunity by
providing a remedy for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1999, the
Court, in effect, extended these rules to protect states against suits in their own
courts.68 Alden v. Maine69 held that states need not provide state court fora to
suits against them that would not be permitted in federal court.70
Before considering how these rules of state immunity and underlying
policies bear on the Maritime case, this article considers a separate line of
cases—those bearing on federal adjudication outside of the Article III courts.
For the question in Maritime concerns whether and how the rules, principles,
and policies of immunity described above should apply to adjudications in
federal administrative agencies.
Agency Adjudication
Article III of the Constitution provides that the “judicial power of the
United States shall be vested” in a Supreme Court and lower federal courts
(“Article III courts”) whose judges, once confirmed, have some insulation
from political pressure.71 Such judges possess life tenure and protection from
reduction in salary during their terms in office.72 The “judicial power” is
defined to include the power to adjudicate the following disputes, among
others, that are relevant to state immunity and to Maritime:
[1] all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States . . . [and] to Controversies [2] to which the United States
shall be a Party . . . [3] between two or more States [4] between a State and
Citizens of another State . . . .73

68. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), 527 U.S. at 706 (holding that state immunity
permits states to refuse to provide state judicial fora to hear suits against states under federal law
despite a general requirement that state courts entertain suits arising under federal law in cases not
involving the state as a defendant).
69. Id. at 712.
70. Id.
71. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. In full, Article III, Section 1 states:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges,
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior,
and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at § 2, cl. 1. That provision contains other controversies as well. In full, it reads:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
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Given that such disputes are part of “the judicial power of the United
States” and that Article III vests that power in the constitutionally protected
Article III courts, it would be natural to conclude that, if a such a dispute is to
be adjudicated before a federal judicial tribunal, then that tribunal must be an
Article III court. The Constitution vests the “judicial power” nowhere else.
Despite the force of the Constitutional text, the Court has allowed numerous
exceptions to Article III’s apparent requirements.74
Some of these exceptions were clearly established by the middle of the
nineteenth century and have been viewed as justified by the Constitution’s text
and original contextual understanding.75 Some exceptions were justified as
implicit; these permitted non-Article III courts to hear cases arising in
territories76 of the United States and court martial cases.77 Early on, there were
suggestions, later confirmed, that non-Article III courts could be established
for the District of Columbia.78
A third set of exceptions, for cases involving public rights, always has
been of uncertain scope and significance.79 These cases involved not just
adjudication by non-Article III bodies dressed up as courts, but also by
executive branch agencies or, in the language of the origins of this body of
law, executive “departments.”80 These cases and their mutating successors
provide the best support for arguments in Justice Breyer’s Maritime dissent

under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more
States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different
States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
Id.
74. See Young, supra note 21, at 789-794 (tracing the development of various exceptions
permitting federal adjudication outside of Article III).
75. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64-66 (1982) (plurality
opinion). The opinion states:
Appellants next advert to a second class of cases — those in which this Court has
sustained the exercise by Congress and the Executive of the power to establish and
administer courts-martial. The situation in these cases strongly resembles the situation
with respect to territorial courts: It too involves a constitutional grant of power that has
been historically understood as giving the political Branches of Government extraordinary
control over the precise subject matter at issue.
Id. at 66. See also Young, supra note 21, at 769.
76. See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
77. See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
78. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 405 (1973) (permitting such legislative
courts for the District of Columbia and discussing earlier cases presaging this decision).
79. See Young, supra note 21, at 847-51.
80. Id.
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that state immunity is generally inapplicable to agency proceedings.81 Whether
that support is sufficient is discussed later in this article.82 What follows below
is a brief summary of the cases.
The public rights line of cases began with adjudication by executive
departments, entities that would today be considered administrative agencies
governed by the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.83 Perhaps the
best understanding of these cases, from their origin in 1855 to the time just
preceding the New Deal and the beginning of the modern administrative state,
is that such cases involved government benefits.84 That was a time before the
development of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.85 Consequently,
government benefits—such as land grants and military pensions—could be
offered on the condition that any one claiming eligibility waive their right to
litigate claims of entitlement in a court.86 Instead, the executive department
would find any facts pertaining to entitlement, subject only to federal-court
review for agency mistakes of law and for agency findings of fact that were
egregiously erroneous given the record of proceedings.87
So the Interior and War Departments could offer land grants on the
condition that anything that resembled a judicial dispute over such entitlements
must be decided in the department with only the skimpiest judicial review in
the federal courts.88 Slowly such cases metamorphosed to permit adjudication
in cases that more resembled regulation of private interests, although
government largess remained in the background, as in the regulation of
railroads, which received large amounts of their roadbed from the federal
government.89
By 1931, the public rights cases crossed a significant line in Philips v.
Commissioner.90 In that case, the Court concluded that, in a tax-liability
dispute between the federal government and a private citizen, findings of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue had been made “final” by statute and could
not be overturned by a reviewing court if supported by any evidence. In the
81. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1885-88 (2002) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
82. See infra note 176-202 and accompanying text.
83. See Young, supra note 21, at 791; see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551
(2000).
84. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855). See N.
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69-70 (1982). The “public rights”
doctrine was first set forth in Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
85. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 145776 (1989) (describing and offering a critique of the existing unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
86. See Young, supra note 21, at 769.
87. Id. at 805, 815, 816.
88. Id. at 799.
89. Id. at 805-07.
90. Philips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (discussed in Young, supra note 21, at 835-37).
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following year, in Crowell v. Benson,91 (repeatedly cited in Justice Breyer’s
Maritime dissent92) these public rights cases were distinguished from “private
rights cases” such as Crowell itself.93 The latter were said to involve the
liability of one private party to another.94 Viewed another way, that would
include Maritime, as private rights cases were those involving the federal
government as providing a tribunal but not itself as a party.95 Crowell and
Phillips, decided a year apart, suggest a broad view of public rights cases,
those in which Article III’s requirements were most relaxed. They suggest that
public rights cases may include all non-criminal cases in which the United
States asserts a claim under a federally created regulatory scheme.96 For such

91. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). See also Commodity Futures Trading Co. v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
92. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1881-90 (2002).
93. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51. In relevant portion, this case states:
The present case does not fall within [the public rights category] just described but is one
of private right, that is, of the liability of one individual to another under the law as
defined. But in cases of that sort, there is no requirement that, in order to maintain the
essential attributes of the judicial power, all determinations of fact in constitutional courts
shall be made by judges.
Id.
94. Id.
95. Public rights cases involved the federal government proceeding, in civil cases, before its
own tribunals to enforce its own laws. Crowell describes the other category as “private rights”
cases involving the “liability of one individual to another,” but it did not consider how a
proceeding against a state in a federal tribunal should be classified. Id. Such suits are necessarily
rare because of state immunity and were rarer still before Court decisions in the late 1930’s
greatly expanded the scope of federal legislative powers under the commerce clause. I believe
that had the Crowell court considered a case such as Maritime, it would have been viewed as
outside the public rights category and equivalent to a private rights suit. There is no reason that
the “public” nature of the defendant state alone should locate a suit against it in the public rights
category where compromises with the literal requirements of Article III are most easily justified.
96. I base this conclusion on aspects from the two cases. Crowell describes itself as a case
involving private rights, “the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined” in
apparent contrast with the public rights cases the opinion had just discussed and distinguished.
Id. at 50-53. Before Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931), and certainly before the
Interstate Commerce Clause cases, one might have thought that public rights cases involved only
government benefits. See Young, supra note 21, at 835-41. Phillips allowed the government to
use its agencies as trial courts in regulating private activity, particularly in making claims against
the private property of individuals under the tax laws. Phillips, 283 U.S. at 595-602. It is
possible to argue formalistically that the “private rights” doctrine pertained only to the validity of
adjudication by legislative courts, not that of agencies. Such a distinction between two types of
non-Article III adjudicating bodies seems, at best, flimsy and, at worst, unreal. By the time of
Phillips, the federal government had become free to provide many civil trials under federal law
only in expert tribunals not protected by Article III’s political insulation for judges. See id. at
598.
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cases, federal agencies and Article I courts were most widely available and
subject to the fewest restrictions.97
At this point the public rights doctrine was potentially huge, but greatly
limited in context by the Supreme Court’s view at the time that many federal
regulatory schemes were substantively unconstitutional. The Court then often
concluded that such regulation violated property or liberty rights protected by
substantive due process, exceeded Congress’ powers under the Interstate
Commerce Clause, or involved unconstitutional delegations of legislative
powers.98 The tax scheme involved in Phillips, by contrast, was within an
island of clear federal power guaranteed by a relatively recent constitutional
amendment permitting federal taxation of income.99
Phillips is a public rights case. Crowell, exemplifying the other category
of cases involving private rights, is an interesting case in ways that bear on
Maritime.100 It involved a federal workers’ compensation scheme in which a
federal agency (the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission)
provided a forum for disputes between two parties, neither of which was any
part of the federal government.101 Maritime may be seen as a similar case. In
Crowell, the dispute was between an individual and his employer, while in
Maritime, the dispute involved a private business and a state. Because of the
Crowell court’s view that private disputes require more exacting Article III
protections than the workers’ compensation statute provided, it simply denied
that the statute had placed the proceeding that it reviewed outside of the Article
III courts. Crowell regarded the federal agency whose decision it reviewed as
an adjunct to the Article III courts. The agency was analogized to masters and
commissioners who sift through complicated and often highly technical facts
as agents for an Article III court that ultimately decides a case.102

97. See Young, supra note 21, at 835-41.
98. The Supreme Court used three principal doctrines to limit economic and social
legislation during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. These included: (1) substantive
due process, (2) a limited reading of Congress’ powers under the Interstate Commerce Clause,
and (3) the doctrine severely limiting delegation of legislative powers to federal administrative
agencies. For the story of these limits and their falling away after a series of Franklin Roosevelt
appointments to the Court in the late 1930s and early 1940s, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4.7 at 151-55 (5th ed. 1995), and ERWIN CHERMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 14 (1997).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (authorizing a federal income tax and thereby negating
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (finding a federal income tax not
apportioned to representation unconstitutional because apportionment according to representation
was required, in the Court’s view, by Article I, Section 9, paragraph 4 of the Constitution of
1789)).
100. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 36-38.
101. Id.
102. The Court in Crowell stated:
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Now, this way of avoiding a conclusion that agency adjudication violated
Article III clearly was a fiction. In workers’ compensation cases such as
Crowell, federal courts were required to enforce Commission orders after
exercising only the slightest review, much less review than an appellate court
would exercise over the decision of a trial court.103 Article III vests the judicial
power, including the power to try federal cases originally, in a set of courts
with specific protections. For cases such as Crowell, the only federal trial
occurred before an agency, and the agency’s findings of fact were subject to
much less Article III supervision than were such findings of federal district
courts subject to review in the courts of appeals.104
But it is important to note a number of things. First, the theory: the
Crowell Court was extremely concerned with cosmetically preserving Article
III values in what it saw as part of the core of Article III—private dispute
resolution within the federal judicial power.105 Hence, the rhetoric that those
Commission adjudications were really decided by Article III courts with the
agency as an adjunct to the courts.106 Second, the reality: given the extremely
narrow scope of judicial review of Commission decisions, what was really
happening was that the Constitution was being bent, under the pressures of
early modern government, to permit the transfer of some federal trials to
executive branch agencies.107 Third, theory meets reality: the narrow judicial
review is more than cosmetic for it helps to balance Article III’s textual claims
against the forces of modernization by retaining some power in the Article III
courts.
On the common law side of the Federal courts, the aid of juries is not only deemed
appropriate but is required by the Constitution itself. In cases of equity and admiralty it is
historic practice to call to the assistance of the courts without the consent of the parties,
masters and commissioners, or assessors, to pass upon certain classes of questions. For
example, to take and state an account or to find the amount of damages. While the reports
of masters and commissioners in such cases are essentially of an advisory nature, it has
not been the practice to disturb their findings when they are properly based upon
evidence. In the absence of errors of law, the parties have no right to demand that the
court shall redetermine the facts thus found. In admiralty, juries were anciently in use not
only in criminal cases but apparently in civil cases also.
Id. at 51-52 (emphasis added). Crowell’s theory that the federal agency was simply an aid to the
federal court that would ultimately decide the matter led to the latter characterization of agencies,
at least in private rights cases, as “adjuncts” to the federal courts. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76-77 (1982).
103. See Young, supra note 21 at 840-56.
104. Id. at 860-61 (concluding that the standard of judicial review of agency factual
conclusions that was applied under the statute in Crowell was much more forgiving of agency
error than is the “clearly erroneous standard” used by federal courts of appeals to review district
court findings of fact.).
105. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 87.
106. Id.
107. See Young, supra note 21, at 789-806.
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Since Crowell, the Supreme Court has never questioned the general
legitimacy of agency adjudication of cases arising under federal enabling acts
and subject to Article III court review of issues of law and very narrow review
of findings of fact.108 After Crowell, in a series of cases in the 1980s, the
Supreme Court dealt with some specialized issues. This began with a plurality
opinion in Northern Pipeline,109 a case striking down adjudication by a nonArticle III Bankruptcy Court of certain claims under state tort and contract law
by a bankrupt’s estate against third parties.110 The plurality, echoing Crowell,
suggested that at least two sorts of legal claims were especially protected under
Article III so that in some circumstances some non-Article III adjudication of
them might be inappropriate.111 These were constitutional claims and private
disputes under state law of the sort that could be heard in federal court under
diversity jurisdiction.112 It further indicated (1) that, where such sensitive nonArticle III adjudication is permitted, either special justification and/or special
protections (often more intensive judicial review) is required, but (2) that in
other cases, (such as public rights cases) non-Article III adjudication needs the
least justifications and safeguards.113
The Northern Pipeline plurality also suggested that non-Article III
adjudication is more problematic in a body dressed up like a court—an Article
I or “legislative” court—than it is in an agency.114 The plurality still clung, at
least nominally, to Crowell’s characterization of administrative agencies as
“adjuncts” of the federal courts.115 The distinction between agencies and
adjuncts, which is always flimsy, was quickly downplayed in cases decided
after Northern Pipeline, as was a powerful distinction between public and
private rights cases.116 In place of such stark dichotomies the Court employed
a multi-factor balancing test dealing with the same issues of need for
adjudication outside of Article III, the nature of the claims considered, and the
amount of review available in an Article III court:117
108. Harold Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN L. REV. 329, 352-57
(1991).
109. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 52 (1982).
110. Id. at 52-54.
111. Id. at 67-72.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 50. But see Kenneth Karst, Poetry, Federal
Jurisdiction Haiku, 32 STAN. L. REV. 229, 230 (1979) (suggesting that there is no real difference
between agencies that adjudicate and Article I courts such as the Bankruptcy Court, ruled
unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline and that “[l]egislative courts are but agencies in drag . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
115. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 78.
116. See Young, supra note 21, at 840-862.
117. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Product Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985). The
Court stated:
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In determining the extent to which . . . adjudication of Article III business
in a non-Article III tribunal impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity
of the Judicial Branch, the Court has declined to adopt formalistic and
unbending rules . . . . Although such rules might lend a greater degree of
coherence to this area of the law, they might also unduly constrict Congress’
ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers.
Thus, in reviewing Article III challenges, we have weighed a number of
factors, none of which has been deemed determinative, with an eye to the
practical effect that the congressional action will have on the constitutionally
assigned role of the federal judiciary . . . . Among the factors upon which we
have focused are the extent to which the “essential attributes of judicial power”
are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to which the nonArticle III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally
vested only in Article III courts, the origins and importance of the right to be
adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the
requirements of Article III.118

These passages provide a rationale for the transfer of some judicial power
from the federal courts to other bodies. They resemble the law that developed
to permit and limit another relaxation of originally-separated powers—the
transfer of legislative power to agencies.119 Thus, they reflect a compromise
between the necessities of modern government and the original values
underlying the vesting of the federal judicial power in Article III courts. This
concludes a brief history of the case law authorizing federal adjudication
outside of Article III’s strictures. Where does it leave Maritime?

This theory that the public rights/private rights dichotomy of Crowell and Murray’s
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. provides a bright-line test for determining
the requirements of Article III did not command a majority of the Court in Northern
Pipeline. Insofar as appellees interpret that case and Crowell as establishing that the right
to an Article III forum is absolute unless the Federal Government is a party of record, we
cannot agree. Nor did a majority of the Court endorse the implication of the private
right/public right dichotomy that Article III has no force simply because a dispute is
between the Government and an individual. . . .
....
The enduring lesson of Crowell is that practical attention to substance rather than
doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform application of Article III. The
extent of judicial review afforded by the legislation reviewed in Crowell does not
constitute a minimal requirement of Article III without regard to the origin of the right at
issue or the concerns guiding the selection by Congress of a particular method for
resolving disputes . . . .
Id. at 585-87 (citations omitted).
118. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (citations
omitted).
119. For a discussion of the Court’s willingness since the late 1930s to allow Congress to
delegate large amounts of legislative power to executive branch agencies with relatively little
guidance, see infra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
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THE MARITIME CASE
With respect to Maritime, the important point is what the entire line of
cases dealing with non-Article III federal adjudication does not do. Such cases
provide no reason to deny (1) that powers vested by the Constitution in the
judiciary have been transferred to the executive branch in ways resembling the
concomitant and parallel transfer of legislative powers to that branch, (2) that
such a transfer requires justification and reasonable doctrinal safeguards to
balance the justifications for change against the values inherent in the original
division of powers, and (3) that any safeguards applying to limit the original
custodians of a power in the exercise of such power should be applied to the
transferee unless the inherent necessities make such continuation not
practicable. In short, the presumption should be that federal power to
adjudicate is limited by state immunity doctrine even when the locus of that
power spreads from Article III courts to legislative courts and agencies.
To provide a concrete parallel example: even if the First Amendment had
not been viewed as applying beyond the scope of its text120 to cover executive
branch actions,121 it would most reasonably be seen as a limit running with the
legislative power so as to apply to any transferee. The same is true of any state
immunity law that limits the use of federal judicial power against states. A
mere transfer of forum, even if sanctioned by modern separation of powers
jurisprudence, should not suffice to extinguish those limits. If they are to be
extinguished, that must be justified by unique aspects of non-Article III
adjudication that distinguish that process from adjudication in federal courts.
Such a stripping away of state immunity would, for example, have to be
justified by attributes of the new repositories of the judicial power. Once
again, the issue concerns constitutional costs and benefits, loss of faithfulness
to the text versus the necessities of modern government, and safeguards
minimizing the tension between the two.
First, is there less need for state immunity in agencies than in courts so that
Article III and state immunity values are not as threatened by adjudication in
agencies as they would be in court proceedings? Here the question is whether
states’ liability at the hands of federal agencies is appreciably less threatening
to the dignitary and fiscal interests of states stressed as the underpinnings of
state immunity in the immunity cases and particularly in Maritime. Do
agencies offer safeguards that reduce the above threats to an acceptable level,
but that are not present in court proceedings?

120. The First Amendment begins “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging freedom of speech . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
121. For example, all of the opinions in the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), assumed that the First Amendment restricts otherwise
discretionary action by the executive branch that unduly represses speech.
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Second, even if agency proceedings present the same threats to state
interests underlying immunity, would applying such immunity to federal
agency adjudications pose sufficiently greater harm to federal interests to
warrant not applying it? Would applying state immunity to agency
adjudication interfere with the vitality of modern government in ways
sufficiently greater than would the recognized immunity to judicial
proceedings?
Any comparison of state immunity in the two contexts must consider the
balance of such differential costs and benefits, if they exist. Although it is
surprisingly less than clear, Justice Breyer’s Maritime dissent ultimately seems
to justify exemption of agency proceedings from immunity not on increased
protections present in agency adjudication, but rather on immunity’s negative
effects on special benefits of governance provided by agencies.122 After a
section describing the Maritime case itself, this article will turn to a
consideration of the force of arguments for and against assimilation of agency
proceedings to those of courts.
The Proceedings in the Agency and Lower Court
The Maritime case arose out of the several attempts, all rebuffed, of a
private corporation, South Carolina Maritime Services (“Cruise Line”), to gain
permission from the State of South Carolina to berth a ship at the state’s
facilities at the Port of Charleston.123 South Carolina, acting through its
agency, State Port Authority (“Port Authority”), refused permission on grounds
that its established policy was to deny such facilities to “vessels whose primary
purpose is gambling.”124 Cruise Line then filed a complaint against the state in
the Federal Maritime Commission (“FMC”), an agency of the federal
government, alleging discrimination against it under the FMC’s enabling act,
the Federal Shipping Act.125 The allegations were that the Port Authority had
refused to negotiate with Cruise Line and had discriminated against it by
granting facilities to other shipping companies with gambling facilities.126 The
remedies sought included injunctive relief and financial compensation, both for
lost profits and for attorneys’ fees.127

122. See infra notes 176-182 and accompanying text.
123. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1868 (2002).
124. Maritime, 122 S. Ct. at 1868.
125. Id. at 1868-69.
126. Id. at 1868.
127. More specifically, the Cruise Line sought:
“(1) . . . a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina ‘enjoining [the SCSPA] from utilizing its
discriminatory practice to refuse to provide berthing space and passenger services to
Maritime Services;’ (2) [an order directing] the SCSPA to pay reparations to Maritime
Services as well as interest and reasonable attorneys’ fees; (3) . . . an order commanding,
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FMC referred the complaint to an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) before
whom Port Authority both interposed an answer on the merits and maintained
that, as an arm of the state, it is entitled to immunity from administrative
proceedings under the Supreme Court’s precedents dealing with the Eleventh
Amendment and related doctrines.128 The ALJ agreed with the latter
contention and ordered the proceedings dismissed.129 Cruise Line did not
appeal the dismissal of its complaint, but the Federal Maritime Commission,
on its own motion, reinstated the complaint concluding that state immunity did
not apply to agency adjudicatory proceedings.130 The Port Authority
immediately appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, which reversed, concluding that state immunity applied to judicialstyle proceedings, whether in court or in agencies.131
The Supreme Court Opinions
Justice Thomas’s opinion for the majority reiterated support for the stateprotective rules recognized in the existing line of immunity cases and for the
notion of a primal state immunity that was a powerful, if only implicit, part of
the original constitutional understanding. As a consequence, state immunity
existed before, and extends far beyond, the Eleventh Amendment’s restrictions
so as to include, among other things, all private suits against states. Justice
Thomas stated:
Dual sovereignty is a defining feature of our Nation’s constitutional
blueprint. States, upon ratification of the Constitution, did not consent to
become mere appendages of the Federal Government. Rather, they entered the
Union “with their sovereignty intact.”
. . . .
. . . the [Constitutional] Convention did not disturb States’ immunity from
private suits, thus firmly enshrining this principle in our constitutional
framework . . . .
Instead of explicitly memorializing the full breadth of the sovereign
immunity retained by the States when the Constitution was ratified, Congress
chose in the text of the Eleventh Amendment only to “address the specific
provisions of the Constitution that had raised concerns during the ratification
among other things, the SCSPA to cease and desist from violating the Shipping Act; and
(4) award Maritime Services ‘such other and further relief as is just and proper.’”
Id. at 1868-69 (footnotes citation omitted).
128. Id. at 1869. For a discussion of the Eleventh Amendment and the wider state immunity
from suit currently recognized by the Supreme Court, see supra notes 24–70 and accompanying
text.
129. Maritime, 122 S. Ct. at 1869.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1869-70.
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debates and formed the basis of the Chisholm decision.” As a result, the
Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope of the States’ sovereign
immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that immunity.132

State immunity doctrine, as described in earlier portions of this article, has
become complex with numerous exceptions, especially one permitting suits
against officers but not against states themselves.133 Some of the distinctions
seem almost casuistic, allowing injunctive suits against state officers, but not
state agencies.134 What precisely are the values that underlie immunity and
thus are to be placed in the balance in determining the appropriate scope of
federal sovereignty vis-a-vis the states? The Maritime majority opinion,
perhaps more than any other in the immunity series, unashamedly identified
the difficult to quantify notion of state “dignity” as the principal value:
The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the
dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.
....
The United States next suggests that sovereign immunity should not apply
to FMC proceedings because they do not present the same threat to the
financial integrity of States as do private judicial suits.
....
This argument, however, reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the
purposes of sovereign immunity. While state sovereign immunity serves the
important function of shielding state treasuries and thus preserving “the States’
ability to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens,” the doctrine’s
central purpose is to “accord the States the respect owed them as” joint
sovereigns.135

Early in his opinion, Justice Thomas apparently refused to join issue with
Justice Breyer’s dissent about whether administrative adjudication, such as that
in Maritime, is an exercise of the judicial power created and governed by
Article III of the Constitution. He stated, “[f]or purposes of this case, we will
assume, arguendo, that in adjudicating complaints filed . . . the FMC does not
exercise the judicial power of the United States.”136 Correctly, in my view,137
his emphasis was not on this loaded and impossible to answer question, but on
whether administrative adjudication is functionally the sort of thing that would
be naturally encompassed by the constitutionally implicit state immunity

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1870-71 (citations omitted).
See supra notes 24-70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
Maritime, 122 S. Ct. at 1874, 1877 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1871.
See infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
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doctrine that has been embraced by the majority.138 Noting the majority’s view
that the doctrine was intended to apply to judicial-style proceedings, but that
the framers were generally unfamiliar with administrative adjudication, Justice
Thomas turned to analyze whether such adjudication sufficiently resembles
court suits so as to warrant coverage under a doctrine intended for the latter.139
His opinion focused on court-like features of administrative adjudication in
which the federal government supplies a forum for a dispute between two
parties, other than the federal government itself.140 Justice Thomas found that
the FMC proceeding bears “a remarkably strong resemblance to civil litigation
in [the] federal courts,” reciting such issues as pleadings, motions, and
discovery.141 Most constitutionally damning was the statute’s requirement that
the Maritime Commission provide a neutral forum for resolution of a
proceeding brought against a state by private parties to deal with legal and
factual issues possessing merit on the face of their complaint.142 In short,
Justice Thomas, quoting the court below, concluded that the agency
proceeding before the FMC “walks, talks, and squawks very much like a
lawsuit.”143
Given his distress, Justice Breyer’s dissent could have made a more
powerful attempt to resist these arguments than it did. Much of the opinion
simply asserts that administrative adjudication is executive branch activity
without offering reasons why immunity limits on judicial-style decisionmaking should not carry over to that context when the executive branch
assumes such a role.144 In only one passage does Justice Breyer seem to advert
to such reasons and then only elliptically.145 Below, I flesh out and explore
what I take to be his argument—that administrative adjudication is different in
ways that would justify either having no state immunity rules or at least
different ones.146 Those differences must either (1) result in a sufficiently
lessened harm to state immunity values posed by adjudication when done by
an agency, or (2) they must result in sufficiently increased benefits of
governance or some sufficient combination of lessened harm and greater
benefits. Below, I show that even fleshed out, what I take to be Justice
Breyer’s implicit arguments are not sufficient to make a case against state

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Maritime, 122 S. Ct. at 1872.
Id. at 1872-77.
Id.
Id. at 1873.
Id. at 1876-77.
Maritime, 122 S. Ct. at 1869 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1881-83.
Id. at 1884-85.
See infra notes 163-202 and accompanying text.
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immunity in this context, given the preceding line of decisions and their
rationale.147
ANALYSIS
Immediately, the majority opinion in Maritime spawned vigorous
criticism. In addition to the anguished dissenting opinions, impressive legal
scholars read Maritime as a radical extension of an already radical line of
cases. Here, again, is some of the reaction:
Nina Totenberg: Reaction to the [Maritime] decision across the ideological
spectrum was less than enthusiastic, to put it mildly. Said one conservative
scholar, “I’m beginning to be embarrassed.”
...
Professor Charles Fried (Harvard): Here we have a chunk taken out of the
power of the federal government, not a private party, to enforce federal law
against the states, and that, I think, is a significant extension, and an
unfortunate one.148

I remain critical of the Court’s cases defining the scope and consequences
of state immunity and am particularly critical of the states’ rights majority’s
recent extensions, beginning with the Seminole opinion.149 Like many others, I
believe that the Court’s extension of state immunity to suits arising under
federal law is illegitimate.150 However, I do not agree that Maritime itself is, in
any clear respect, a radical extension of the recent ill-considered cases.151
Given the state immunity cases immediately preceding it, Maritime breaks
little new ground on the surface of the opinion. State immunity to agency
proceedings brought by private parties against states as named parties or
seeking damages from state treasuries seems entailed by those earlier cases. In
147. Id.
148. NPR, supra note 2.
149. See Young, supra note 7, at 1429 n.120.
150. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
151. In this respect, I find myself in, what is for me, the strange company of Bruce Fein:
Totenberg: Conservative Bruce Fein said the decision is largely symbolic.
Mr. Bruce Fein (Conservative): It seems to be, you know, a lot of bombast about very
little.
NPR, supra note 2. My objection, like those of some other scholars interviewed, is to the entire
recent line of immunity cases:
Totenberg: And Yale’s Akhil Amar saw the decision as the latest example of what he said
is a conservative willingness to disregard the words of the Constitution.
Mr. Akhil Amar (Yale): This is anything but strict construction of the Constitution, so this
is yet another case in which the current Supreme Court is, in effect, striking down federal
action without something clearly in the text or history of the Constitution to support that
invalidation.
Id.
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particular, the results in Maritime follow easily from combining the rationales
of the immunity cases with a reasonable view of the relationship of agency
adjudication to the values underlying Article III of the Constitution.152
However, the portion of Maritime dealing with a claim for injunctive-style
relief is filled with disturbing overtones, even though, on the surface, it also
follows from pre-existing case law.153
Claims for Monetary Compensation
In the portion of Maritime that deals with a claim for monetary
compensation from a state for its past wrongs, the majority opinion applies the
immunity rules that would have been applicable to a comparable federal court
proceeding.154 On the surface of things, this is not surprising, and its
correctness depends on whether the two sorts of proceedings—court
adjudication and agency adjudication—are sufficiently similar, in terms of the
policies underlying state immunity, to warrant applying the same immunity
rules to both.
1.

The Weakest Case for Lifting State Immunity: Agency Proceedings
that are Functionally Identical to Those in Federal Courts

Let us imagine the weakest case for an exemption from state immunity for
agency adjudication and then see if the reality of most agency adjudication is
significantly different. The weakest case would involve the use of agencies to
supply fora for dispute resolution that are in all relevant ways functionally
identical to courts. This would constitute nothing more than evasion of state
immunity.
For these purposes, adjudication by an agency is functionally identical to a
court proceeding against a state if the following are true: (1) The agency is
empowered to adjudicate certain federal claims against states, and possibly
against private parties as well, but not to engage in extensive lawmaking in the
cases that it adjudicates. Therefore, it possesses no more authority than federal
courts to make policy while adjudicating cases.155 (2) Like a court, it possesses
no discretion to dismiss claims meeting threshold requirements of legal and
factual plausibility. By this, I mean that it is required to adjudicate any cases
that would survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and
a motion for summary judgment. (3) The agency can order either injunctive
style relief or monetary compensation for harm done to individuals resulting
from state violations of federal law. (4) The agency’s orders are meaningful.

152.
text.
153.
154.
155.

See supra notes 24-70 and accompanying text; see infra notes 71-119 and accompanying
See infra notes 186-209 and accompanying text.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895, 955 (1996).
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Specifically, they must be enforceable either directly by United States marshals
or, more traditionally, by the marshals after a confirming federal court order.
On these assumptions, Congress has used an agency, exactly as it would a
court, to do that which is prohibited by state immunity. Thus, there is a surface
appearance that Congress has evaded state immunity without functional
justification. Are these appearances deceiving or does agency adjudication
constitute a constitutional evasion?
In this hypothetical set of cases in which functional differences are not
available to justify less state immunity to federal agency proceedings than to
federal court proceedings, the only difference that might suffice would
somehow have to be rooted in such an agency’s different position in the
separation of powers. More specifically, it would have be based on the
agency’s status as an executive branch entity156 and not an Article III Court. In
the absence of further justification, this seems a formalistic reason. It is also
troubling in another way because the Constitution nowhere provides for
agency adjudication of disputes within the federal judicial power.
Let us start with formalism and evasion and then deal with the judicial
power issue. Given the nature of the extreme case that we are exploring first—
that of an agency that provides no benefit to the federal government other than
a forum in substitution for the federal courts—no unique benefits of
156. In some cases, the agency, while executive in nature, may be classified as independent.
This means that the agency head or heads can be removed only by the President for cause
specified in a statute.
The heads of all agencies exercising general regulatory power or adjudicatory power are
appointed by the President of the United States as required by the Appointments Clause, or in
most other cases, by heads of departments who are themselves appointed by, and removable by,
the Presidents. The Appointments Clause reads:
[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2. The Appointments Clause has been held to provide the exclusive
constitutional means for appointment of officers of the United States. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 139-40 (1976). The textual provisions for removal—the impeachment provisions—have been
held nonexclusive. The Court has permitted Presidents to remove most officers of the United
States for any reason or “at will.” However, in appropriate circumstances, Congress by law may
restrict the President’s removal power to circumstances involving non-political good cause such
as malfeasance or inability to perform adequately. In this case, the officer or agency created is
said to be independent. Even so, the President must have “for cause” removal power over such
officers sufficient to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. See generally Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-92 (1988) (allowing the creation of agencies largely “independent” of
the President but requiring an adequate minimum of presidential removal power).
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governance plausibly could outweigh the policies underlying immunity.
Certainly, eliminating state immunity cannot count as such an advantage, for
that begs the question. We are looking for a valid reason not to apply
immunity in this setting. Later, we will consider other cases in which agencies
that adjudicate do perform more functions of government than do courts. In
those cases, perhaps the added value of agency adjudications might justify
immunity rules less stringent than those applied to courts, and perhaps not.
But at least where agency adjudication offers government no more benefits
than do court proceedings, the only argument in favor of agencies over courts
is on the cost side of the equation, not on the benefit side. This cost-side
argument is that agency proceedings inflict less of the harm that state
immunity seeks to avoid. Specifically, agency proceedings pose less of a
threat to the states’ rights values underpinning immunity. Those values are
protection of states’ fiscal well-being and the preservation of state dignity.
How could locating an adjudicating body in the federal executive branch
(and thus outside the judicial branch) reduce the threat to a defendant state’s
fiscal well-being and dignity in actions brought against it by private parties?
The only argument to this effect that I can identify is that agencies are
politically accountable in ways that federal courts are not, and that this
difference is sufficient to overcome the constitutional policies that would
support immunity in a court action. While accountability and political checks
continue under current case law, just barely, to warrant subjecting states to
substantive regulation under Congress’ Article I powers,157 recent immunity
cases make clear that a national political decision is not sufficient to justify
subjecting states to suits brought by private parties.158 In short, states can be
regulated under Congress’ general regulatory powers, but these regulations
generally cannot be enforced by privately initiated and controlled adjudication.
This is precisely the point of Seminole’s repeal of Union Gas, prohibiting
Congress from eliminating state immunity except when it is legislating under
Reconstruction Amendments and only when practically necessary to remedy
constitutional violations of those amendments as interpreted by the federal

157. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556-57 (1985). Garcia
overruled National League of Cities v. W.J. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Id. at 554-57
(concluding that, with rare exceptions, the Court should not invalidate federal legislation,
otherwise within Congressional power, simply because states are the objects of regulation, and
finding states’ representation in the national political process usually a sufficient protection of
their interests). In dissent, Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O’Connor seemed to vow to overrule
Garcia in the future and restore National League of Cities. Id. at 580, 589.
158. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59-73 (1996) (overruling an earlier
case that allowed Congress to abrogate state immunity when imposing duties on states in
legislation supported by the Interstate Commerce Cause and apparently restricting such powers of
abrogation to legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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courts.159 When Congress exercises more common legislative powers, for
example when Congress acts under the Interstate Commerce Clause, the laws it
enacts cannot create private remedies that cut through state immunity.160
There are objections to these arguments but they seem weak. For example,
one might say that a statute directly enforced by courts reflects political
consensus at one time (the time of enactment), while one enforced by agencies
has its meaning filtered through a branch more responsive to current politics, at
least in cases in which the agency is not independent. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council partly justifies judicial deference to
agency interpretations on similar grounds.161 But this seems weak as a
justification for lifting state immunity. First, agency interpretations hold sway
only within any clear limits imposed by statutes, so agency political
accountability offers states no protection under statutes imposing liability on
them under a scheme providing little or no agency discretion.162 Second, to the
extent that agencies do possess discretion to adjust the impact of a statute
imposing liability on states, it is not altogether clear that the direction of
adjustment will tend toward more protection of state interests over long-run
constitutional time. If we are simply dealing with the substitution of agencies
as fora for disputes against states, such a substitution fails to add any
protection for states sufficient to warrant application of immunity rules
different from those applied in federal court.

159. Id. at 59-73 (5-4 decision), overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5
(1989) (holding that, when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Congress has power to
create a cause of action in favor of a private party against a state for monetary damages).
160. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
161. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)
(requiring judicial deference to many agency interpretations of enabling acts). Chevron made a
similar, but perhaps crucially different, argument that presidential political accountability
considers that:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the
Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not
on the basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which
Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that
delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to
inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to
make such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged
with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
Id. This is not the only reason Chevron offered for its rule of deference. It could not stand alone
because independent agencies interpretations are also entitled to deference under the Chevron
doctrine.
162. Id. at 842-43 (finding that “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.”).
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Most factors cut the other way, making clear that if states were to be
exposed to what are essentially private damage claims, then Courts, not
agencies, would be the constitutionally preferred forum. On this view, which
is Justice Thomas’, if courts cannot hear such claims, then by the greater logic,
neither can agencies.163 What supports such a position? First, there is
symbolism. The federal courts are one of three co-equal branches of the
federal government. It seems plausible enough to claim that, if states are to be
subject to suits anywhere despite immunity, then the dignity interest stressed
by the Supreme Court in the immunity cases164 would require the most
distinguished set of tribunals. Second, and related to the first, is a notion that,
in federalism cases, the Article III Courts may be more than just another coequal branch. Perhaps their existence reflects an attempt to come as close as
possible to creating, within the federal government, a branch that can neutrally
arbitrate disputes between the federal government and the states.165 In a sense,
the federal courts might be seen at the same time as inevitably within, but in
some ways outside of, the federal government.
These two are connected with a third reason, the text of Article III of the
Constitution and its underlying policies. The text of Article III appears to
guarantee to litigants a right that certain claims litigated against them before
federal tribunals will be heard in federal court.166 There is no reason to believe
that these guarantees apply in weaker form to states as litigants than they do to
private parties. Federal administrative adjudication within the judicial
power—for example, adjudication involving cases arising under federal law—
needs to be justified in light of the Article III’s grant of the federal judicial
power to the politically insulated courts that it creates or authorizes.167 All
federal agencies that adjudicate, hear cases that are within the judicial power,
because all arise under federal law. Any case such as Maritime, raising a state
immunity issue, also involves a suit actually or arguably against a state, or the
immunity issue would not arise. Suits in which a state is a party are within the
federal judicial power as defined in Article III. Finally, Maritime itself also
touches on admiralty, another part of the judicial power.168 In ordinary
163. In Maritime, Justice Thomas stated that:
One, in fact, could argue that allowing a private party to haul a State in front of such an
administrative tribunal constitutes a greater insult to a State’s dignity than requiring a
State to appear in an Article III court presided over by a judge with life tenure nominated
by the President of the United States and confirmed by the United States Senate.
See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Port Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1874 n.11 (2002).
164. See supra note 135.
165. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A
DEMOCRACY (1960) (stressing the court’s unique suitability for resolving differences between
states and the federal government concerning the proper contours of federalism).
166. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 117-121 and accompanying text.
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language, the proceedings in Maritime were at least twice and possibly thrice
within the judicial power.
I want to be as clear as possible about what I am not asserting. I am not
suggesting that federal agency adjudication is unconstitutional on the ground
that it usurps the judicial power of the United States. I largely agree with the
Supreme Court cases permitting a great deal of non-Article III adjudication by
federal agencies and Article I courts.169 But all of the modern cases recognize
that such adjudication is a departure from the original constitutional scheme
that must be justified by reasonable necessity and hemmed in by appropriate
safeguards.170 In this respect, the course of these decisions resembles those
approving congressional delegation of large amounts of legislative power to
executive branch agencies. These rulemaking decisions allowed executive
branch agencies, in essence, to make laws of the United States as long as they
stayed within the very loose limits of enabling statutes.171 In this way, the
Court bent the original Constitution so that it would not break under the
pressures of modern governmental realities.172 The decisions dealing with
transfer of judicial power to agencies,173 like those permitting administrative

169. See supra notes 73-118 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 81-118 and accompanying text.
171. The most recent powerful indication is Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531
U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001), where the Court stated: “In short, we have almost never felt qualified to
second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to
those executing or applying the law.” Id. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989).
172. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 427 (1944) (allowing a federal Price
Administrator the power to promulgate regulations specifying the prices of commodities subject,
among other limits, to the proviso that such prices be “fair and equitable”). In this case, the Court
stated that:
The Constitution as a continuously operative charter of government does not demand the
impossible or the impracticable. It does not require that Congress find for itself every fact
upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself detailed
determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to the application of the legislative
policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to
investigate. The essentials of the legislative function are the determination of the
legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of
conduct—here the rule, with penal sanctions, that prices shall not be greater than those
fixed by maximum price regulations which conform to standards and will tend to further
the policy which Congress has established. These essentials are preserved when Congress
has specified the basic conditions of fact upon whose existence or occurrence, ascertained
from relevant data by a designated administrative agency, it directs that its statutory
command shall be effective. It is no objection that the determination of facts and the
inferences to be drawn from them in the light of the statutory standards and declaration of
policy call for the exercise of judgment, and for the formulation of subsidiary
administrative policy within the prescribed statutory framework.
Id. at 424-25 (citation omitted).
173. See supra notes 71–118 and accompanying text.
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“rulemaking,”174 recognize the departure from the original constitutional
balance and, to some extent, a departure from the values underlying the
original balance. The decisions attempt safeguards to preserve the original
constitutional policies as well as they can be in the new age.175 The reasonable
assumption should be that any limit on adjudication of cases within the federal
judicial power applies to adjudication by non-Article III tribunals unless there
is sufficient justification for finding it inapplicable. Congress cannot transfer
rulemaking power to agencies shorn of limits on congressional lawmaking (for
example the First Amendment’s protections for speech) unless there is some
justification. And, according to the states’ rights majority, state immunity was
an implicit part of Article III from the beginning. For those Justices, it was an
unstated limit on the scope of the federal judicial power. So, in the extreme
case posed above in which an agency functions solely as would a court open to
private disputes, not applying the same state immunity rules simply permits
evasion while furthering no constitutional values.
2.

The Strongest Case for Lifting State Immunity: Adjudication Before
Agencies that Is Not Functionally Identical to that in Federal Courts.

If the usual case of agency adjudication were identical to adjudication in a
federal court, then it is difficult to see why states should not be at least as
immune to the former as to the latter. As discussed above, suspending
immunity is doubly suspect based on the premises of the recent immunity
cases. First, administrative adjudication is the very sort of process leading to
precisely the sort of state liability that the framers wished to eliminate.
Second, it is adjudication by executive branch officers, not politically insulated
Article III’s judges, and in that respect, was not envisioned by the framers. If
state interests were all that counted and the framers had intended to expose
states to litigation, surely the forum of choice would have been an Article III
court. However, federal agency adjudication is not identical to the same
process in an Article III court. Thus, the question becomes whether the
differences justify a suspension of the usual rules of immunity for litigation
against states. If Justice Breyer has a valid objection to the letter of the
Maritime majority opinion (leaving its disturbing overtones until later), it must
be that functional differences between court and agency adjudication warrant
suspension of the usual immunity rules for the latter.

174. See generally 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 3:1-3:10
(2d ed. 1978) (discussing delegation doctrine and its abandonment). For examples of cases
upholding delegations despite vague standards, see Yakus, 321 U.S. at 427; Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 404 (1940); United States v. Rock Royal Co-op Inc., 307 U.S.
533, 574 (1939).
175. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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However, much of Justice Breyer’s dissent seems an unconvincing and
formalistic attempt to argue that simply because agencies are part of the
executive rather than the judicial branch, they can do what courts do without
the same immunity restrictions.176 This dissent repeatedly cites Crowell v.
Benson in support of this proposition.177 But Crowell is not apposite. The
Crowell majority saw the entire matter in the administrative adjudication that
they review as occurring, in theory, in an Article III court. Recall that Crowell
is a case permitting a strongly binding initial determination by an agency of a
workers compensation claim.178 In effect, the agency was the only federal trial
court available to the parties in Crowell.179 But Crowell’s theory was that the

176. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1881 (2002) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) Justice Breyer felt that:
The legal body conducting the proceeding, the Federal Maritime Commission, is an
“independent” federal agency. Constitutionally speaking, an “independent” agency
belongs neither to the Legislative Branch nor to the Judicial Branch of Government.
Although Members of this Court have referred to agencies as a fourth branch” of
Government . . . the agencies, even “independent” agencies, are more appropriately
considered to be part of the Executive Branch . . . . The President appoints their chief
administrators, typically a Chairman and Commissioners, subject to confirmation by the
Senate . . . . The agencies derive their legal powers from congressionally enacted statutes.
And the agencies enforce those statutes, i.e., they “execute” them, in part by making rules
or by adjudicating matters in dispute.
Id. (citations omitted). Justice Breyer stated further: “The Court’s principle lacks any firm anchor
in the Constitution’s text. The Eleventh Amendment cannot help. It says: ‘The Judicial power of
the United States shall not . . . extend to any suit . . . commenced or prosecuted against one of
the . . . States by Citizens of another State.”‘ Id. at 1883. In neither of these passages does
Justice Breyer explain how resolution of a dispute between adverse parties and having the subject
matter specified in Article III of the Constitution and thus within the judicial power is transmuted
into something other than an exercise of that power simply because an act of Congress commits it
to an administrative agency for resolution. See infra note 233 and accompanying text. The
citation to Crowell is not apposite because Crowell viewed the agency whose activities it
reviewed as an adjunct to an Article III court in resolving a dispute that was within the judicial
power. See infra note 192 and accompanying text. The Court seems to have abandoned, as a
fiction, Crowell’s view that an agency, adjudicating a dispute between two parties other than the
United States is simply an adjunct to an Article III reviewing court. However, it has been
abandoned for a more realistic separation of powers jurisprudence that allows the executive
branch to exercise both some of the legislative power and some of the judicial power, subject to
limits designed to balance concerns of constitutional stability and needed change. See infra note
192 and accompanying text. From this modern perspective, Justice Breyer’s task is to explain
why the judicial power transferred to the executive branch in Maritime should not transfer subject
to the same state immunity limits that would apply in a federal court. He seems to make one
sketchy argument to this effect. I attempt to elaborate this argument and discuss it in the text
above, concluding that it is insufficient to warrant different rules for agencies and courts. See
infra note 192 and accompanying text.
177. See Maritime, 122 S. Ct. at 1881-89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
179. See id.
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entire matter was adjudicated by the Article III courts, with the agency as a
fact-finding adjunct to a real federal court (the reviewing court) operating
within the federal judicial power.180 Presumably, had the claim asserted in
Crowell been against a state, then the agency proceeding would have been
barred as one moored to a federal court case itself barred by state immunity.
At one point, however, Justice Breyer does seem to suggest a real
functional difference between federal agencies and courts that is worthy, at
least, to be considered as justification for the application of different state
immunity rules:
The Court long ago laid to rest any constitutional doubts about whether the
Constitution permitted Congress to delegate rulemaking and adjudicative
powers to agencies . . . . Consequently, in exercising those powers, the agency
is engaging in an Article II, Executive Branch activity. And the powers it is
exercising are powers that the Executive Branch of Government must possess
if it is to enforce modern law through administration.
....
Twentieth-century legal history reinforces the appropriateness of this
description. The growth of the administrative state has led this Court to
determine that administrative agencies are not Article III courts . . . that they
have broad discretion to proceed either through agency adjudication or
through rulemaking, . . . and that they may bring administrative enforcement
proceedings against States. At a minimum these historically established legal
principles argue strongly against any effort to analogize the present
proceedings to a lawsuit . . . brought by a private individual against a State in a
federal court.181

I believe that Justice Breyer’s point in the italicized excerpts above is that
agency adjudication is often hybrid, combining dispute resolution with policymaking in ways that are very different from court adjudication and warrant
suspension of the usual immunity rules. Perhaps the notion is that the public
regulatory aspects of what are otherwise private disputes adjudicated by
agencies make them, in effect, proceedings by the United States and thus not
subject to immunity. Certainly, adjudicative aspects of such cases are private,
resembling private lawsuits in a federal court. Indeed, Crowell says they are
Article III private suits with the agency as a fact finding adjunct. So the
dissenters’ point must be that such disputes are hybrid, adding public
regulatory aspects to what would otherwise be a more static, than dynamic,
interpretation of statutes in the process of resolving individual disputes.

180. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56-58 (1932). See supra note 161 and accompanying
text.
181. Maritime, 122 S. Ct. at 1881-82, 1885 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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To give Justice Breyer his due, it is true that most agency adjudications do
provide more than fora that are the functional equivalent of a federal court
forum for dispute resolution. Most agencies, including the Federal Maritime
Commission, possess considerably more power than courts to engage in
lawmaking, however, one chooses to draw the line between that process and
statutory interpretation.182 Courts possess relatively limited lawmaking
powers. By contrast, most agencies possess the power to make statute-like
substantive rules within the considerable leeway allowed them by their
enabling acts.183 To sharpen the contrast with federal courts, agencies possess
very wide, but not unlimited, discretion to choose to use their delegated
lawmaking powers either in rulemaking proceedings or in adjudications.184 By
this, I mean that under Chevron, agencies are often enabled to make law
broadly, in the course of adjudications. Administrative law cases antedating
the federal Administrative Procedure Act and affirmed in recent years make it
clear that agencies may exercise their delegated power to make (not simply
interpret) law either through a legislative-style process, or through the decision
of cases in adjudication.185
The Chevron doctrine, which dominates the current world of judicial
review of federal administrative action, treats ambiguity in an agency’s
enabling act as a delegation to the agency to resolve it in any reasonable
way.186 This is true in formal adjudications as well as in both formal and

182. The Maritime Commission’s decisions have been accorded deference under the Chevron
doctrine. Transpacific Westbound Rate Agreement v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 951 F.2d 950 (9th Cir.
1991). This means that the Commission is recognized to have lawmaking authority within limits
set by its enabling act. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001). In
Mead, the Court stated: “We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting
Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking
or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.” Id. at 229.
183. Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors In Administrative
Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1463, 1477 (2000) (“[T]he courts generally have implied broad
rulemaking authority from less than clear delegations to agencies.”) (footnote omitted). See also
Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 609-14 (1991); Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v.
FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting a “lack of hesitation in construing broad grants
of rule-making power to permit promulgation of rules with the force of law”); Pub. Serv.
Comm’n v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 327 F.2d 893, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (“All authority of the
Commission need not be found in explicit language . . . . While the action of the Commission
must conform with the terms, policies and purposes of the Act, it may use means which are not in
all respects spelled out in detail.”) (citation omitted).
184. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 293 (1974) (finding that “‘the choice
made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies
primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency’” (quoting SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)).
185. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
186. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984) (“If
[the agency’s interpretation of its enabling act] . . . represents a reasonable accommodation of
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informal rulemaking.187 Contrast this with federal courts which, with rare
exceptions (for example, contempt cases), never institute the matters before
them and that have seen their law-making authority greatly decrease in recent
years.188
As a consequence, agency adjudication is often a vehicle for making law in
ways that federal court proceedings are not. So, even if agency adjudication
imposes the same costs on states as court litigation, the former might be seen
as providing sufficiently more regulatory benefits to the federal government to
warrant the application of different immunity rules.
Does this make such adjudications the equivalents of “suits by the United
States” and, thus, not subject to state immunity even though initiated by a
private party seeking monetary compensation from a state? If so, is it because
the proceeding is “by the United States,” or because it is not a suit at all or
both? There is, of course, no answer in the abstract. The real question is,
given the constitutional values underlying state immunity, how should we
define “suits” and “suits by the United States.” In short, we revert to
considering whether such agency proceedings should be covered by immunity
or not.
There are two ways to argue that, based on agencies’ power to make law in
adjudications, the usual immunity rules should not apply to privately-initiated
proceedings against states in agency fora. The first argument is based on a
constitutional cost-benefit analysis that attributes sufficient extra value to
agency proceedings to warrant relaxing immunity rules in order to encourage
those proceedings. This sort of constitutional argument surely will not be
accepted by all critics. My point immediately below is that, even if one

conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb
it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one
that Congress would have sanctioned.” (citations omitted)). The Court has used implicit
delegation as its rationale for deference to agency interpretations. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 134 (2000) (“Deference under Chevron to an
agency’s construction of a statute that it administers is premised on the theory that a statute’s
ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory
gaps.” (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44)).
187. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (stating that “the overwhelming
number of our cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication.”).
188. Lund, supra note 155, at 955 (finding that the Court appears to have made the
presumption favoring incorporation of state law virtually irrebuttable). The article stated:
The Court indicated that federal courts may ‘displace’ the state law rule only when two
conditions exist: when there is a ‘significant conflict’ between some federal policy or
interest and the use of state law, and when the federal policy is one that is ‘genuinely
identifiable’ from a federal statute.
Id.
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accepts the validity of such an argument, the extra benefits of agency
adjudication do not seem sufficient to warrant different rules.
The second argument, based on precedent rather than directly on
constitutional policy, is that the existing case law that deals with non-Article
III adjudication in “public rights suits” supports different immunity rules. This
argument may overlap the first, because the precedent in question may be
based on an acceptance of arguments resembling the first. Even treated as a
separate argument, the second proves weak. Immediately below, I start with
the first argument based on a constitutional cost-benefit analysis.
This first argument is that the opportunity to hear privately-initiated
litigation against states provides opportunities for policymaking having
benefits beyond the particular proceeding in which the policy is made. Here
the focus is not some perceived extra fairness of administrative adjudication
against states. No amount of fairness provides the protection of state immunity
rules that specify that there should be no proceeding at all. The focus, instead,
is on the federal government’s need to subject states to suits in order to
regulate optimally in a variety of fields such as securities regulations, labor
relations, and environmental protection. The argument must be that such
administrative adjudication offers opportunities to hammer out policy that can
later be useful to government well beyond the otherwise forbidden context of
private suits against states. The policy, once made in cases seeking monetary
compensation from states, would apply both to private interests and to states.
On this view, the unique value of an agency proceeding is simply that it
provides an opportunity to make policy with a broader, more legislative and
discretionary quality than the small scale policy made by courts in the
interstices of statutes.
Intuitively, this hardly seems sufficient, regardless of how many
policymaking opportunities are at stake. Even if we take such opportunities as
a great value, there are ample other occasions for the federal administrative
state to develop policy to govern private interests and even to govern states.
First, in most cases where states are regulated along with private actors, an
agency can deploy its delegated lawmaking power to develop new law in a
series of cases against the private actors.189 Second, such policy can be made
in agency proceedings against states initiated by the agency itself without
violating existing immunity rules. Third, unless the Court chooses to greatly
narrow Ex Parte Young or rule it inapplicable to agency proceedings, privately
initiated suits to restrain state officers from violating agency enabling acts and
regulations remain vehicles for policy making as well as specific dispute
resolution.

189. See Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 293; supra note 186 and accompanying
parenthetical.
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Finally, most agencies possess an alternative way to make policy—the
power to formulate legislative rules that bind states, enforceable by suits and
agency action brought by the United States, as well as by private suits seeking
to enjoin state officers’ violations of federal regulations.190 If one agrees with
the Court’s current immunity jurisprudence, it is difficult to imagine that a
relatively few more opportunities for an agency to make policy justify an
exception to the very strong constitutional policy that states should not be
subjected to private damage suits and to the strong, if symbolically-based,
policy that they should not be the named party in a suit to restrain future
violations of federal law.
The second argument is based on the line of cases, discussed above,
allowing non-Article III adjudication of “public rights” issues in non-Article
III courts that raise questions analogous to agency adjudication.191 One might
make the argument that some agency cases entertaining private damage claims
are like public rights cases, involving not just the provision of a forum, as in
Crowell, but also the use of the adjudication as a device for more active federal
regulation by an expert federal agency. This might make adjudication by an
agency more like a suit by the federal government (not subject to immunity if
brought in a court) than like a private damage suit, which is subject to
immunity. This already seems largely a recapitulation of the cost-benefit
argument rejected above. Even if treated as somehow separate, based on
precedent of which the cost-benefit underpinnings will not be reexamined, it
still seems weak.
First, the public rights doctrine never has been clear and it is problematical
in many ways.192 But even accepting the doctrine on its own difficult terms,
the best description of the cases dealing with the permissibility of non-Article
III, federal court-like bodies, is that, as the cases adjudicated involve subjects
perceived to need special protection, the Court has required more
safeguards.193 These protections, which help to justify non-Article III trials,
190. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
191. See Young, supra note 21, at 791-840, 847-69.
192. Id. at 863-65.
193. As to especially sensitive rights, constitutional rights, asserted in a criminal case, the
Northern Pipeline Court required intensive safeguards:
In United States v. Raddatz, 477 U.S. 667 (1980), the Court upheld the 1978 Federal
Magistrates Act, which permitted district court judges to refer certain pretrial motions,
including suppression motions based on alleged violations of constitutional rights, to a
magistrate for initial determination. The Court observed that the magistrate’s proposed
findings and recommendations were subject to de novo review by the district court, which
was free to rehear the evidence or to call for additional evidence. Id. at 676-77, 681-83.
Moreover, it was noted that the magistrate considered motions only upon reference from
the district court, and that the magistrates were appointed, and subject to removal, by the
district court.
Id. at 685 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
In short, the ultimate
decisionmaking authority respecting all pretrial motions clearly remained with the district
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are supervision or appellate review by an Article III court.194 As cases increase
in sensitivity, the Court has required more protection.195 At some point as
sensitivity increases, the most intense protections are insufficient to deal with
the problem, and no safeguards suffice. Consequently, a trial must be provided
in an Article III court as opposed to some alternative.196 Among the sensitive
subjects requiring great safeguards are not just issues that might encroach on
constitutional rights but also those that involve state-created rights.197 The
inclusion of state-created rights might seem somewhat strange, but it is the list
we are given.198 Where non-Article III adjudication of state-created rights is
necessary to the operation of some legitimate federal statute—as in bankruptcy
adjudication—it has been permitted, but only at the price of more Article III
court review. Such non-Article III adjudication of state-created rights seems
forbidden if not an integral part of some valid federal operation. Thus, it is
fairly clear that pure diversity cases, tried federally, cannot be consigned either
to an Article I court or to an agency.199

court. Id. at 682. Under these circumstances, the Court held that the Act did not violate
the constraints of Art. III. Id. at 683-684.
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 79 (1982). While perhaps not as
sensitive as constitutional rights, state created rights also merited more protection under Article
III than statutory rights created by Congress. See supra notes 175-177.
194. See Raddatz, 477 U.S. 667; N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. 50.
195. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. 50.
196. This is what happened in Northern Pipeline with respect to ordinary state-created
contract and tort claims that would have been cognizable in federal court only under diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction where assigned to a non-Article III tribunal for adjudication. See N.
Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 71-76 (holding that “Art[icle] III bars Congress from
establishing legislative courts to exercise jurisdiction over [specified matters.]”). A majority
found this unconstitutional. Id. at 76. The plurality made clear its view that such adjudication
could not be supported whether the Bankruptcy Court was viewed as an Article I court or as an
adjunct to an Article III court. Id. at 76-87.
197. Id. at 81. The Northern Pipeline Court held that:
[W]hile Crowell certainly endorsed the proposition that Congress possesses broad
discretion to assign factfinding functions to an adjunct created to aid in the adjudication of
congressionally created statutory rights, Crowell does not support the further proposition
necessary to appellants’ argument—that Congress possesses the same degree of discretion
in assigning traditionally judicial power to adjuncts engaged in the adjudication of rights
not created by Congress.
Id. at 81-82. The two examples of rights created by lawmakers other than Congress requiring
more Article III safeguards are federal Constitutional rights and state created rights such as
contract and tort law. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 80-87.
198. For a historical and legal discussion on the state immunity doctrine and agency
adjudication, see supra notes 22–116 and accompanying text.
199. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 83-84 (“No comparable justification exists,
however, when the right being adjudicated is not of congressional creation. In such a situation,
substantial inroads into functions that have traditionally been performed by the Judiciary cannot
be characterized merely as incidental extensions of Congress’ power to define rights that it has
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This begs the question whether a suit against a state as a named party or
seeking damages from a state is as sensitive in terms of federalism as a private
diversity case. Surely an affirmative answer follows from the Court’s state
immunity jurisprudence up to Maritime.200 The Article III jurisprudence, in a
highly prophylactic way, is aimed at giving litigants a fair forum and, in
diversity cases, preserving a particular balance of federalism.201 State
immunity jurisprudence is aimed at insuring what the court sees as an
appropriate balance of federal and state powers by, among other things,
insuring that in most circumstances, states need not subject themselves in any
forum to damage suits brought against them by private parties, even under
valid federal statutes.202 The underpinnings of state immunity are not
concerned with providing states with fair fora in which to be sued by private
interests. Instead, state immunity is aimed at assuring that there will be no
forum, or suit, whatsoever.
Claims for Injunctive-Style Relief
While I believe that the portion of Justice Thomas’ opinion that concerns
claims for monetary compensation is just a straightforward application of a bad
line of cases, other aspects of his opinion are troubling. Justice Thomas also
finds the agency barred from hearing a claim for injunctive relief.203 One

created. Rather, such inroads suggest unwarranted encroachments upon the judicial power of the
United States, which our Constitution reserves for Art. III courts.”).
200. The current majority’s conclusion that retention of such immunity by states was a basic
condition of entrance to the Federal Union seems to peg its constitutional importance at the high
end of the spectrum. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
201. The point of vesting the judicial power in Article III judges—who hold tenure for life,
during good behavior, and whose salaries cannot be diminished during their term in office—is to
provide against certain forms of political pressure that would be difficult to establish on a caseby-case basis.
202. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1879 (2002) (opining
that the Framers’ aim was to guard “against encroachments by the Federal Government on
fundamental aspects of state sovereignty [in order] to maintain the balance of power embodied in
our Constitution and thus to ‘reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.’”) (citation
omitted).
203. Id. at 1879. Justice Thomas stated:
Finally, the United States maintains that even if sovereign immunity were to bar the FMC
from adjudicating a private party’s complaint against a state-run port for purposes of
issuing a reparation order, the FMC should not be precluded from considering a private
party’s request for other forms of relief, such as a cease-and-desist order. As we have
previously noted, however, the primary function of sovereign immunity is not to protect
State treasuries . . . but to afford the States the dignity and respect due sovereign entities.
As a result, we explained in Seminole Tribe that “the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a
State is irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.” . . . We see no reason why a different principle should apply in the realm
of administrative adjudications.
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easily could write this off as not troubling, given the fact that the agency
proceeding was brought against a statewide agency.
Suits against statewide agencies have been regarded as against the state for
purposes of immunity.204 Given this position, then, as to the injunctive-style
relief sought and the claims for compensation previously discussed, Maritime
applies to federal agencies the same rules of immunity that would apply in
federal court. The doctrine of Ex Parte Young exempts from immunity suits
against state officers seeking to enjoin violations of federal law, but,
presumably on grounds of state dignity, it does not exempt suits seeking the
same relief against the state (or a statewide agency) as a named party.
Arguments in the previous section strongly support the conclusion that
agencies and courts are not sufficiently different in ways relevant to the
policies underlying immunity such that different rules should apply to them.
Putting these premises together, Maritime is more of a logical extension than a
radical extension of existing immunity law.
Despite this, I am concerned that nowhere in his opinion does Justice
Thomas indicate that immunity would have fallen away had the suit been
brought against the agency’s head, in his official capacity, rather than against
the state as a named party.205 While one might conclude that this is just an
instance of the Court’s deciding no more than that which is presented, I am not
satisfied that this is all that is going on. Justice Thomas’ opinion is sweeping
in its emphasis on the importance of the constitutional policy of according
states “dignity.”206 Elsewhere he notes one alternative to privately initiated
Id. (citations omitted). To review the other remedies the Appellant sought, see the quote
accompanying footnote 127.
204. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 781-82 (1978) (requiring dismissal, on grounds of state
immunity, of proceedings brought against Alabama and its Board of Corrections by current and
former inmates seeking a mandatory injunction to improve prison). See also HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 32, at 1056 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 459 (1974) (reversing
that portion of a lower court decision permitting, in a lawsuit against state officers, an award of
retroactive monetary compensation to be paid from a state’s treasury)).
205. There is a section of Justice Thomas’ opinion that might be read to suggest that exactly
the same rules of immunity that apply to federal courts apply to federal agencies. See supra note
203.
Other portions of Justice Thomas’ opinion leave open the interpretation that, at the least,
most state protective immunity applicable in courts should apply in federal agencies. On this
view, court immunity rules may be just the minimum that apply to agency adjudications:
One, in fact, could argue that allowing a private party to haul a State in front of such an
administrative tribunal constitutes a greater insult to a State’s dignity than requiring a
State to appear in an Article III court presided over by a judge with life tenure nominated
by the President of the United States and confirmed by the United States Senate.
Maritime, 122 S. Ct. at 1875 n.11.
206. For example, Justice Thomas stated:
The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is
consistent with their status as sovereign entities. “The founding generation thought it
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federal agency proceedings against states—proceedings initiated by the federal
government itself207—but nowhere does he mention privately-initiated agency
proceedings against state officers as an alternative.
Recall the compromise between state immunity and state accountability to
supreme federal law that was clarified by the Court early last century in Ex
Parte Young.208 States could not be named as defendants in suits brought by
individuals, even those seeking only injunctive-style relief requiring future
compliance with federal law.209 But individuals could enforce valid federal
rights they possessed against states by bringing Ex Parte Young suits, such as
those suing a state officer,210 in her official capacity, for a mandatory or
negative injunction requiring future compliance.211 This distinction seems to
turn largely on dignity interests, because virtually the same protective outcome
can be achieved regardless of whether the state is a party.212 Plaintiff simply
sues the appropriate officer and her successors rather than the state itself. In its
other aspect, the doctrine prohibited suits by individuals seeking to recover
damages against state treasuries for past wrongs, regardless of whether the
state itself or an officer was named as a defendant.213 This seems to be the
substantive core of state immunity because substance, not form, is paramount.
Finally, suits by the United States, at least if not simply evasions of the rules
stated above, have not been subject to state immunity.214
If the portion of the proceeding in Maritime in which a private party sought
an injunction had been authorized by statute to begin in federal court and not
an agency, then, under existing case law, state immunity would not have
applied, provided the agency proceeded against a state officer.215 If the
majority had a firm understanding that what was fatal in Maritime was that the

‘neither becoming nor convenient that the several States of the Union, invested with that
large residuum of sovereignty which had not been delegated to the United States, should
be summoned as defendants to answer the complaints of private persons.’”
Id. at 1874 (citations omitted). See supra notes 133-143 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Thomas’ opinion.
207. See Maritime, 122 S. Ct. at 1878.
208. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908), which permitted suits against state officers in order to stop unconstitutional state
action by means of a fiction that the suit is not against a state.
209. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 150-51 (citing cases illustrating this point).
210. See id. at 63-66.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 657-59 (1974) (reversing that portion of a lower
court decision permitting, in a lawsuit against state officers, an award of retroactive monetary
compensation to be paid from a state’s treasury). See also supra notes 30, 46, 185 and
accompanying text.
214. United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965).
215. See supra notes 63-66, 204 and accompanying text.
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proceedings were against a state agency rather than its head officers, it would
have been easy to allay speculation. It would have been easy to avoid fruitless
motions to dismiss on immunity grounds and needless appeals in future court
cases. For this reason, I believe the odds are much more than negligible that
these aspects of Maritime are a trial balloon for a future holding that Ex parte
Young’s logic does not apply to administrative cases. Moreover, much less
probably, but still possibly, they may be a harbinger of the erosion of Ex parte
Young within its original federal-court domain.
If there might be a question about the wisdom of applying Ex parte Young
to administrative proceedings, let us deal with it head on. Should Ex parte
Young apply to administrative adjudications? In other words, had the state
agency’s chief officer been proceeded against in Maritime, instead of the state
itself, should injunctive style relief nevertheless have been barred? Should
either state immunity or the Tenth Amendment be seen as inconsistent with
requirements that states go through a federal agency proceeding preliminary to
a court proceeding for an injunction? One states’ rights objection might be that
the expense of one federal court trial proceeding and possible appeal is enough
of a burden on states, and adding prior agency litigation expense crosses over
the line of permissible burdens. Other objections, reverberating within the
Maritime majority’s emphasis on state dignity issues, might be that having the
facts found by the agency to be nearly untouchable by the reviewing federal
enforcement court216 and having the law fixed by that agency, subject only to
limited review under the Chevron doctrine,217 denies the state the most august

216. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc., v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The court noted:
When the arbitrary or capricious standard is performing that function of assuring factual
support, there is no substantive difference between what it requires and what would be
required by the substantial evidence test, since it is impossible to conceive of a
“nonarbitrary” factual judgment supported only by evidence that is not substantial in the
APA sense—i.e., not “‘enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a
verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn . . . is one of fact for the jury.’”
Id. at 683-84 (citations omitted).
217. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (requiring
reviewing courts to defer to any reasonable interpretation by an agency of its enabling act as long
as it is not clearly precluded by the statute when interpreted using traditional tools of statutory
interpretation). The Court held:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose
its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
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trial tribunals in one of the most sensitive type of cases, that of determining the
freedom left to a state by federal law.
On the other hand, not allowing initial agency determination has
drawbacks that would make difficult the regulation of states under legislative
powers that were granted in the Constitution, such as the Commerce Clause.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority218 generally continues to
permit such regulation despite vows from some of the current states’ rights
majority to return to the more restrictive rules of constitutional federalism that
prevailed from 1976 to 1985.219 Most regulation of states under federal law
has also involved regulation of private parties acting similarly. Indeed, the
Court’s opinions might (or might not) be read as requiring such generality as a
condition of valid federal regulation of states under the Commerce Clause.220
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted). Later, the Court equates permissible constructions with
reasonableness:
“If [the agency’s interpretative] choice represents a reasonable accommodation of
conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not
disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the
accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.”
Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)).
218. 469 U.S. 528, 556-57 (1985) (concluding that, with rare exceptions, the Court should not
invalidate federal legislation, otherwise within Congressional power, simply because states are
the objects of regulation, and finding states’ representation in the national political process
usually a sufficient protection of their interests).
219. In 1976, the Court held that, in addition to questions of the scope of affirmative grants of
power under the Commerce Clause, regulations of states raised questions of special protections
for their sovereignty. The Court then prohibited regulation of states’ activities, even if
sufficiently affecting interstate commerce as long as these were integral functions of government.
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1976). These were read so broadly
that regulating ambulance services, operating a municipal airport, and operating a highway
authority were regarded by lower federal courts as integral and protected. Garcia, 469 U.S. at
538. The line between integral and non-integral functions was very difficult to draw. Id. Garcia
overruled National League of Cities. Id. at 557 (concluding that, with rare exceptions, the Court
should not invalidate federal legislation, otherwise within Congressional power, simply because
states are the objects of regulation, and finding states’ representation in the national political
process usually a sufficient protection of their interests). In their dissent, Justices Powell,
Rehnquist and O’Connor seemed to vow to overrule Garcia in the future and to restore National
League. See id. at 580, 588-89.
220. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187-88 (1992) (holding that either the
Tenth Amendment or implicit Constitutional principles of federalism prohibits Congress from
compelling states to enact laws with a content specified by federal law). Justice O’Connor’s
opinion for the Court declined to reconsider case law allowing Congress to regulate states
pursuant to original legislative powers such as the Commerce Clause. Id. at 160. But she did,
perhaps, suggest that such laws must, in order to be valid, regulate private conduct along with that
of states. Id. at 160. This may be what she meant by the word “generally” in the following
passage:
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To apply Chevron to private defendant cases involving requirements of a
particular statute administered by a federal agency, but not to cases under the
same statute with state officer defendants, leads to multiple interpretations of
regulatory statutes and chaos.221 To apply appropriate deference to neither set
makes the value of agency adjudication much more diminished. No longer
would adjudication be a tool of policy making in areas where Congress cannot
specify all of the important rules. Chevron is based on the premise that
ambiguity in an agency’s enabling statute should be treated as a congressional
delegation to the agency to make law by resolving the ambiguity in any
reasonable way.222 To apply less deference to agency statutory interpretations
in actions against states would be to apply a different anti-delegation doctrine
for delegations of the power to regulate individuals than to delegations to
regulate states. Much later, I will discuss my concerns that the Court may do
this in other respects as well.223
Arguments for an extremely stingy or completely prohibitive doctrine
concerning administrative regulation of states are intelligible, but they have the
disadvantage of practically insulating states from significant portions of federal
regulation still permitted by Garcia.224 By this I mean that requiring courts to
abandon Chevron deference for enforcement proceedings brought against
states by private parties would (a) eliminate or at least greatly narrow agencies’
delegated powers to regulate and (b) lead to more conflicts among federal
circuits on the meaning of regulatory statutes.
One way of avoiding these problems is through direct enforcement of the
statute by an agency proceeding initiated by the agency itself instead of by a
private party. There are possible drawbacks to this as an alternative. First, it is
possible that some agencies’ enabling acts make direct agency enforcement
impossible or at least more difficult than privately-initiated injunctive actions.
However, this should be unusual. A more serious concern is that limiting the
government to its own direct enforcement makes it more difficult for the
government to use the private incentives to help ferret out violations and drive
enforcement of regulatory policies. These are problems when the agency is
Most of our recent cases interpreting the Tenth Amendment have concerned the authority
of Congress to subject state governments to generally applicable laws.
Id. (citing cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, both of which apply to private and state employers).
221. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093
(1987).
222. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)
(“Deference under Chevron to an agency’s construction of a statute that it administers is premised
on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the
agency to fill in the statutory gaps.”).
223. See infra section entitled “Broader Fears.”
224. See supra notes 205-220 and accompanying text.
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sympathetic to the privately-initiated proceedings. The problems may be
greater when the agency lacks sympathy for claims that are nevertheless
legally legitimate. In these cases, there would be near absolute immunity from
statutory protections running against states. It is one thing for an agency to
adjudicate a case with deferential judicial review. It is quite another for it to
decline to bring an enforcement proceeding. In the latter case, there is often no
judicial review at all on the ground that the decision to commence an
enforcement proceeding is “committed to agency discretion.”225
States might object not only to federal court deference to agency legal
interpretations in privately-initiated agency adjudications, but also to deference
to agency fact-finding. An agency sued in court is entitled to fact-finding done
by an Article III judge, a jury, or a master greatly controlled by an Article III
judge. The issue is whether state dignity interests are unduly diminished by
subjecting states to agency fact-finding, subject only to federal court review
under either the substantial evidence or the arbitrary and capricious test.226
This problem, if it is real, could be solved much more easily and without the
chaos (discussed above) that would be engendered by two different degrees of
deference to agency legal interpretation—one for cases in which the
interpretation might affect state interests and another for other cases. Factfinding, unlike statutory interpretation, radiates few effects beyond the case in
which it occurs.
Thus, without creating serious systemic side effects, constitutional
federalism could be seen as requiring de novo federal court review on the
record for any finding of true fact that the state disputes.227 This would have
225. E.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (finding that “the principles of
administrative law [generally call for courts to] defer to [the agency]”) (citation omitted).
226. The “scope of review” provisions of the APA read as follows:
[A federal court reviewing agency action shall:]
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be —
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to section 556 and 557 of this
title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by the statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the
reviewing court.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2000). Standard 2(A) governs, among other things, review of fact finding in
informal agency proceedings and 2(E) governs such review in the context of formal proceedings.
One of the best explanations of the federal APA’s two standards of review for agency fact finding
can be found in an opinion written by Justice Scalia when he was a United States Court of
Appeals judge. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc., v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 682-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
227. During one era, other parts of the Constitution, particularly the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, were seen as requiring de novo fact finding for facts undergirding constitutional
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little effect on application of the statute to private interests regulated under the
same statute. Certainly, it would amount to discriminating in favor of states
and against private regulated interests, but not nearly so much as allowing
states to avoid such proceedings entirely.
As the passages above make clear, any attempt to stop agency adjudication
resulting in an injunctive order against a state would go a long way toward
making it difficult to regulate states in circumstances when the regulatory field
is complex, technical, rapidly changing, and/or highly varied. In such cases,
even a very well thought-out and carefully crafted statute is not likely to
accomplish Congress’ regulatory goals without the mediation of a policymaking agency. Together, the arguments above seem to rebut any argument
that would differentiate agency injunctive proceeding from a similar federal
court suit permitted under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young.
It is important to recall that in the section supra entitled “Claims for
Monetary Compensation,” dealing with agency proceedings seeking monetary
compensation against states, the lack of differences between agencies and
courts worked in favor of applying immunity to both sorts of proceedings.228
Courts cannot entertain such suits, so why should functionally equivalent
agencies? This section deals with injunctive-style relief against state officers.
Here, similarities work the opposite way because such suits are not seen as
offending state immunity and are thus allowed in courts. As previously
surveyed, the differences between the court and agency actions of this sort are
not different in sufficiently troubling ways so as to warrant a different result.
Only if one rejects the legitimacy of federal agency adjudication of disputes
within the federal judicial power—and I do not—should agency adjudication
of private injunctive actions against states be seen as constitutionally
problematic.
So far in this section, I have been discussing whether Maritime should
have been decided differently, as to its injunctive aspects, if the appropriate
state officers rather than the state itself had been sued. Beyond this, perhaps
Justice Breyer is right as to Maritime on its facts, even though the state itself
was sued. The Maritime dissenters argued that any injunctive-style order
issued by the agency could be enforced only in a federal court suit brought by

rights. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920). This
requirement has all but been eliminated. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S.
38, 53 (1936). For a general discussion of these matters, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 32,
at 397. However, traces of such a requirement exist in matters of the utmost urgency such as
claims of United States citizenship by those about to be deported. See Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S.
748, 753 (1978) (“[T]he Constitution requires that there be some provision for de novo judicial
determination of claims to American citizenship in deportation proceedings.”) (dicta used in
interpreting an immigration statute). The current states’ rights majority might see the claims of
constitutional federalism as sufficiently compelling to require more factual review.
228. See supra notes 47, 154 and accompanying text.
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the agency (the United States), and that such a suit is not covered by immunity.
By itself, this hardly seems adequate. It would allow an agency to be used as a
trial court, and judicial review would, in many instances, be a rubber stamp,
given the great deference courts accord agency decisions. The irony would be
that the rubber stamping courts could not have heard such a case themselves.
Further, this view would permit privately-initiated agency damage proceedings
against states, which is an almost impossible outcome given the immunity
cases preceding Maritime. Perhaps the dissenters’ arguments work better if
applied to the limited world of privately-initiated agency actions seeking
injunctive relief.
One could stress the role of the moving private parties before the agency as
private attorneys-general, bringing violations to the attention of the
government. Unlike damage suits, proceedings seeking injunctive-style relief
have more of a public law flavor than suits seeking damages. A damage suit
largely concerns sorting out the past and making particular parties whole.
Certainly, an injunction often benefits private parties—sometimes just one
party. But like legislation, injunctive relief is a forward-looking attempt to
force compliance with supreme federal law. The benefits often radiate out to
protect interests beyond those of the particular plaintiff, and, ultimately, those
of the general public. With respect both to the injunctive proceeding before it
and its decision to seek court enforcement, presumably the agency exercised at
least the discretion of a court of equity and presumably more. This discretion
has public interest as a main focus.
Beyond this, the difference seems razor-thin between (a) a proceeding
seeking injunctive relief brought by the agency at the urging of a private party
and thus not barred by state immunity, and (b) one brought directly by a
private party before the agency, but subject to the agency’s considerable
equitable discretion. Indeed the difference seems symbolic. For this reason,
one could argue that not only should the Ex Parte Young doctrine permit
agency injunctive-like orders against state officers, but also that such
proceedings—viewed from agency start to court finish—are more plausibly
assimilated to suits brought by the United States, and for this reason, not
subject to state immunity.
However, there is no reason to believe that the Court will soon recant the
injunctive aspects of its Maritime opinion. Certainly, the distinction between
suits against states and suits against state officers seeking essentially the same
relief is largely symbolic and based on state dignitary interests. But the
symbolism of state dignity has long been honored by the line drawn in Ex
Parte Young, and state dignitary interests seem even more important to the
current majority than to those of years past.
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Broader Fears
The concerns discussed above could be seen, in a way, as a ghost story. If
so, it is one told in a context in which the ghosts just might be real. Justice
Thomas did not repudiate the application of Ex Parte Young to administrative
proceedings, but his opinion leaves concern that the Court may do this. I
believe that this and other possible extensions of state immunity are
responsible for the hostile reaction to Maritime. What other extensions lurk?
If the Court applies different immunity rules to agency proceedings than to
court proceedings, will other rules be also applied differently, in the name of
states’ rights? Will the anti-delegation doctrine apply differently so as to
require tighter legislative controls when the delegation creates agency
discretion to issue rules and regulations governing states? Will the exception
to immunity for proceedings brought by the United States be reconsidered as
especially threatening when shaped by an agency whose orders and rules are
the objects of great deference by Article III courts?
Furthermore, if the Court refuses to apply Ex Parte Young to
administrative proceedings, will that just be a step toward narrowing the
doctrine generally, as applied to court proceedings as well? Will Ex Parte
Young come under reconsideration by more members of the states’ rights
majority than the two Justices who urged limiting such court suits in Coeur
D’Alene?229 The opinions in that case do not suggest that this will happen.
However, resignations and new Supreme Court appointments may put pressure
on Young and the predominant method of holding states accountable in courts.
CONCLUSION
In a sense, Maritime formally breaks no new ground. Ultimately,
administrative adjudications against states as named parties or against state
officers seeking damages from the state’s treasury are not sufficiently
distinguishable from analogous proceedings in courts to justify exemption
from the doctrine of state immunity as embraced by a majority of the current
Supreme Court. The language of Article III of the Constitution vests the
judicial powers of the United States in the regular federal courts, and state
229. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 287-88 (1997) (holding that
certain suits against state officers to quiet title to land and that implicate major state interests are
outside of the exception to state immunity recognized for suits seeking prospective relief against
state officers and, thus, barred). Justice Kennedy’s opinion (otherwise for the majority), which
was joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, took the position that the availability of an injunction
against a state officer, under the Ex parte Young doctrine should depend upon a balancing test
including, as one factor, the availability of relief in state courts. Id. at 270-88. Justices
O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas disagreed on this point, concluding that the suit in Coeur d’Alene
was barred by a narrow exception to Ex parte Young suits, which they saw as presumptively
within the federal courts jurisdiction, and not generally barred by principles of federalism
including immunity. See id. at 291-97 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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immunity was designed to limit such power. Consequently, the burden of
persuasion is on those who would justify exemption for any sort of judicialstyle proceeding. Such a proponent must show: (1) that agency adjudication is
significantly less threatening to the constitutional policies underlying state
immunity than is a court suit, (2) that such adjudication has special advantages
of governance that justify exemption, or (3) some satisfactory combination of
the first two.
In this respect, Justice Breyer’s opinion, arguing that Maritime is a
troubling extension of bad doctrine, seems an exaggeration. In Maritime,
damages were sought against a state treasury and, as to the portion of the case
seeking an injunctive remedy, the state was named a party. Each would have
been barred if brought in a court.
In one way, I do agree with Justice Breyer. As to the injunctive remedy, it
would be preferable to see the proceeding as a public action brought by the
federal government for public purposes going beyond the interests of the
parties who sought the remedy. In other words, it is justifiable to see the
Maritime proceedings, in this respect, as an action by the federal government
and, consequently, as exempt from state immunity as it would be had it been
brought in a federal court by the United States as plaintiff. But even this issue
seems less than momentous. It would be entirely consistent with the letter of
the majority’s opinion for agencies to adjudicate privately-initiated
proceedings seeking injunctive style relief so long as state officers, and not the
state, are the named defendants. The difference is only symbolic—the same
protection against states is available in another form.
Recall that Justice Breyer read his dissent from the bench, expressing
unhappiness in ways that go beyond his general objection to the recent state
immunity cases that preceded Maritime:
Where does the Constitution contain the principle of law that the Court
enunciates? I cannot find the answer to this question in any text, in any
tradition, or in any relevant purpose. In saying this, I do not simply reiterate
the dissenting views set forth in many of the Court’s recent sovereign
immunity decisions. For even were I to believe that those decisions properly
stated the law—which I do not—I still could not accept the Court’s conclusion
here.230

Given what a small extension of the previous line of state immunity cases
that Maritime represents, what is so troubling to Justice Breyer and his partners
in dissent? Some of the disquiet is, of course, an objection to the already
extant decisions. I think most of it lies in an already existing apprehension
about where the state decisions will lead in the future and in aspects of the
Maritime opinion that might be seen as threatening really drastic changes.
230. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1881 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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These may include narrowing the current law governing injunctive-style
proceedings against state officers. It may also include a restriction of the
freedom of the federal government to use agencies as regulatory instruments
when states are the regulated parties. Such a combination of federalism with
separation of powers—specifically, special rules for federal regulation of states
could threaten agency rulemaking as well as agency adjudication when states
are targets.
We wait to see how pressures for and against centralization of government
in the United States, new elections, and possibly new justices, will continue the
not-so-smooth curve of American constitutional federalism. In the meantime,
Maritime has exacerbated an already bad case of nerves among those who fear
that the Court has only begun to unduly limit the effective scope of federal
regulatory power as it vies with claims made on behalf of state autonomy.
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